arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2511.04465cs.GTcs.AIcs.LGecon.TH
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订阅平台上的防欺诈收入分配

Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms

University of Oxford, UK(牛津大学);Harvard University, USA(哈佛大学)

Abheek Ghosh, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh, Giannis Tyrovolas

AI总结:

本文针对订阅平台收入分配中的欺诈问题,形式化三种抗操纵公理,指出现有主流机制既无法防欺诈又使检测计算困难,并提出满足全部公理的新规则 ScaledUserProp,实验证明其更公平。

摘要:

我们研究了一个基于订阅的平台模型,其中用户支付固定费用以无限访问内容,创作者获得收入的一部分。现有的欺诈检测方法主要依赖机器学习方法,与恶意行为者进行持续的军备竞赛。我们探索了本质上抑制操纵行为的收入分配机制。我们形式化了三种抗操纵公理,并考察了哪些现有规则满足这些公理。我们表明,流媒体平台广泛使用的一种机制不仅无法防止欺诈,而且使检测操纵在计算上变得难以处理。我们还引入了一种新规则 ScaledUserProp,它满足所有三种抗操纵公理。最后,使用真实世界和合成流媒体数据的实验支持 ScaledUserProp 作为与现有规则相比更公平的替代方案。

英文摘要:

We study a model of subscription-based platforms where users pay a fixed fee for unlimited access to content, and creators receive a share of the revenue. Existing approaches to detecting fraud predominantly rely on machine learning methods, engaging in an ongoing arms race with bad actors. We explore revenue division mechanisms that inherently disincentivize manipulation. We formalize three types of manipulation-resistance axioms and examine which existing rules satisfy these. We show that a mechanism widely used by streaming platforms, not only fails to prevent fraud, but also makes detecting manipulation computationally intractable. We also introduce a novel rule, ScaledUserProp, that satisfies all three manipulation-resistance axioms. Finally, experiments with both real-world and synthetic streaming data support ScaledUserProp as a fairer alternative compared to existing rules.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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