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arXiv 2510.18062cs.GTcs.MA
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关于带弃权(不执行)的孔多塞陪审团定理

On Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention

Technion-Israel(以色列理工学院);IITH-India(印度信息科学与技术研究所)

Reshef Meir, Ganesh Ghalme

AI总结:

本文研究异质参与成本与启发式关键信念下的成本投票模型,刻画弱/强消失关键程度导致的均衡差异,并给出陪审团定理成立的 sharp 阈值。

摘要:

著名的孔多塞陪审团定理指出,在多数规则下,随着人口增长,两个备选方案中更优者被选中的概率趋近于一。我们研究一种非对称设定:投票者面临不同的参与成本,并对自身的关键程度(影响结果的能力)持有可能是启发式的信念。在一个成本投票设定中,当参与成本高于其关键程度估计时,投票者会弃权(不执行);我们识别出启发式信念的单一性质——弱消失的关键程度——它会产生多个稳定均衡,且选举在这些均衡中几乎势均力敌。相比之下,强消失的关键程度(如标准的投票微积分模型)产生唯一的平凡均衡:随着人口增长,只有零成本投票者参与。随后,我们刻画非平凡均衡何时满足某一版本的陪审团定理:在一个明确阈值以下,多数人偏好的候选人以趋近于一的概率获胜;在该阈值以上,两名候选人要么以相等概率获胜。

英文摘要:

The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study an asymmetric setting where voters face varying participation costs and share a possibly heuristic belief about their pivotality (ability to influence the outcome). In a costly voting setup where voters abstain if their participation cost is greater than their pivotality estimate, we identify a single property of the heuristic belief -- weakly vanishing pivotality -- that gives rise to multiple stable equilibria in which elections are nearly tied. In contrast, strongly vanishing pivotality (as in the standard Calculus of Voting model) yields a unique, trivial equilibrium where only zero-cost voters participate as the population grows. We then characterize when nontrivial equilibria satisfy a version of the Jury Theorem: below a sharp threshold, the majority-preferred candidate wins with probability approaching one; above it, both candidates either win with equal probability.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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