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arXiv 2408.00317cs.GTcs.MA
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带弃权(不执行)的孔多塞陪审团定理

Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention

Ganesh Ghalme, Reshef Meir

AI总结:

本文研究带弃权(不执行)的非对称双候选者投票模型,提出选民高估关键性的有限理性框架,证明关键性估计对胜差的依赖强弱分别决定孔多塞陪审团定理是否成立。

摘要:

著名的孔多塞陪审团定理认为,随着群体规模趋于无穷大,多数规则会以概率1从两个可用选项中选择出最佳选项。我们在一个非对称的双候选者设定下研究这一结果,其中两位候选者的支持者可能具有不同的参与成本。当弃权(不执行)决策是完全理性的,即当投票关键性等于出现平局的概率时,唯一的均衡结果是一个平凡均衡:除投票成本为零的选民外,所有选民都弃权(不执行)。我们提出并分析了一个更实用的、有限理性模型,在该模型中选民高估了自身的关键性,并证明在该模型下会出现非平凡均衡,其中两位候选者的获胜概率都远离1。我们证明,当关键性估计强烈依赖于胜差时,在任何非平凡均衡中,无论群体规模多大,都无法保证任何候选者获胜,这与孔多塞的论断相反。而当对胜差的依赖较弱时,孔多塞陪审团定理得以恢复。

英文摘要:

The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric two-candidate setup, where supporters of both candidates may have different participation costs. When the decision to abstain is fully rational i.e., when the vote pivotality is the probability of a tie, the only equilibrium outcome is a trivial equilibrium where all voters except those with zero voting cost, abstain. We propose and analyze a more practical, boundedly rational model where voters overestimate their pivotality, and show that under this model, non-trivial equilibria emerge where the winning probability of both candidates is bounded away from one. We show that when the pivotality estimate strongly depends on the margin of victory, victory is not assured to any candidate in any non-trivial equilibrium, regardless of population size and in contrast to Condorcet's assertion. Whereas, under a weak dependence on margin, Condorcet's Jury theorem is restored.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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