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arXiv 2510.04486quant-ph

伪随机酉算子、伪随机等距算子与类伪随机函数态之间的黑盒分离

Black-Box Separation Between Pseudorandom Unitaries, Pseudorandom Isometries, and Pseudorandom Function-Like States

Aditya Gulati, Yao-Ting Lin, Tomoyuki Morimae, Shogo Yamada

AI总结:

该研究通过构建酉算子谕示和基于量子奇异值变换的敌手,证明了伪随机酉算子、伪随机等距算子与类伪随机函数态生成器三类量子伪随机原语之间的三类黑盒构造不可能性,部分解决了其等价性开放问题。

摘要:

伪随机函数(PRFs)是经典密码学中最基础的原语之一。另一方面,在量子密码学中,有可能PRFs不存在但其量子类似物存在,并且仍能支撑包括对称密钥加密(SKE)、消息认证码(MACs)、承诺、多方计算等在内的众多应用。伪随机酉算子(PRUs)[Ji, Liu, Song, Crypto 2018]、伪随机等距算子(PRIs)[Ananth, Gulati, Kaleoglu, Lin, Eurocrypt 2024]以及类伪随机函数态生成器(PRFSGs)[Ananth, Qian, Yuen, Crypto 2022]是PRFs的主要量子类似物。PRUs蕴含PRIs,PRIs蕴含PRFSGs,但反向蕴含关系仍不明确。一个重要的开放问题是这些PRFs的天然量子类似物是否等价。在本文中,我们通过排除它们的黑盒构造部分解决了该问题:1. 不存在从PRFSGs构造O(logλ)-辅助比特PRUs的黑盒方法。2. 不存在从PRFSGs构造具有O(logλ)扩展度的O(logλ)-辅助比特PRIs的黑盒方法。3. 不存在从具有Ω(λ)扩展度的PRIs构造具有O(logλ)扩展度的O(logλ)-辅助比特PRIs的黑盒方法。此处,O(logλ)-辅助比特指生成算法至多使用O(logλ)个辅助量子比特。具有s(λ)扩展度的PRIs是指将λ个量子比特映射到λ+s(λ)个量子比特的PRIs。为排除上述黑盒构造,我们构建了一个可分离它们的酉算子谕示。针对这些分离结果,我们基于量子奇异值变换构建了一个敌手,该敌手本身具有独立研究价值,且应可用于量子密码学中的其他谕示分离研究。

英文摘要:

Pseudorandom functions (PRFs) are one of the most fundamental primitives in classical cryptography. On the other hand, in quantum cryptography, it is possible that PRFs do not exist but their quantum analogues could exist, and still enabling many applications including SKE, MACs, commitments, multiparty computations, and more. Pseudorandom unitaries (PRUs) [Ji, Liu, Song, Crypto 2018], pseudorandom isometries (PRIs) [Ananth, Gulati, Kaleoglu, Lin, Eurocrypt 2024], and pseudorandom function-like state generators (PRFSGs) [Ananth, Qian, Yuen, Crypto 2022] are major quantum analogs of PRFs. PRUs imply PRIs, and PRIs imply PRFSGs, but the converse implications remain unknown. An important open question is whether these natural quantum analogues of PRFs are equivalent. In this paper, we partially resolve this question by ruling out black-box constructions of them: 1. There are no black-box constructions of $O(\logλ)$-ancilla PRUs from PRFSGs. 2. There are no black-box constructions of $O(\logλ)$-ancilla PRIs with $O(\logλ)$ stretch from PRFSGs. 3. There are no black-box constructions of $O(\logλ)$-ancilla PRIs with $O(\logλ)$ stretch from PRIs with $Ω(λ)$ stretch. Here, $O(\logλ)$-ancilla means that the generation algorithm uses at most $O(\logλ)$ ancilla qubits. PRIs with $s(λ)$ stretch is PRIs mapping $λ$ qubits to $λ+s(λ)$ qubits. To rule out the above black-box constructions, we construct a unitary oracle that separates them. For the separations, we construct an adversary based on the quantum singular value transformation, which would be independent of interest and should be useful for other oracle separations in quantum cryptography.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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