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arXiv 2510.01434cs.GT
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为贝叶斯说服设计可推断的信号传递方案

Designing Inferable Signaling Schemes for Bayesian Persuasion

University of Texas at Austin(德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校)

Caleb Probine, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu

AI总结:

该研究针对贝叶斯说服中接收方需通过重复交互推断信号方案的场景,推导性能损失与样本量界,提出两种可推断信号方案设计方法,并验证其在安全警报场景的有效性。

摘要:

在贝叶斯说服中,掌握信息的发送方观测到状态后,会承诺采用一种随机化信号传递方案,以引导自利接收方的行动。经典模型假设接收方知晓该承诺。而我们研究的是接收方通过重复交互推断信号方案的场景。我们给出了发送方相对于已知承诺场景的性能损失上界,该上界项随信号空间规模增大而增长,随接收方最优行动的区分度提升而减小。随后,我们推导了在推断场景下,发送方近似达到已知承诺场景性能所需样本量的下界。我们证明,与包含承诺但无信号传递的Stackelberg博弈中的领导者相比,说服场景下的发送方需要更多样本。受这些界的启发,我们提出两种设计可推断信号方案的方法:一种是针对发送方在推断场景下的效用进行随机梯度下降(SGD),另一种是采用有限理性接收方模型进行优化。SGD在低交互量场景下表现最优,但将接收方建模为有限理性并调整理性常数,仍为可推断方案的设计提供了一种灵活方法。最后,我们将SGD应用于一个安全警报示例,结果表明,与已知承诺场景相比,该方法找到的方案信号数量更少,且使公民的最优行动区分度更高。

英文摘要:

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the setting where the receiver infers the scheme from repeated interactions. We bound the sender's performance loss relative to the known-commitment case by a term that grows with the signal space size and shrinks as the receiver's optimal actions become more distinct. We then lower bound the samples required for the sender to approximately achieve their known-commitment performance in the inference setting. We show that the sender requires more samples in persuasion compared to the leader in a Stackelberg game, which includes commitment but lacks signaling. Motivated by these bounds, we propose two methods for designing inferable signaling schemes, one being stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the sender's inference-setting utility, and the other being optimization with a boundedly-rational receiver model. SGD performs best in low-interaction regimes, but modeling the receiver as boundedly-rational and tuning the rationality constant still provides a flexible method for designing inferable schemes. Finally, we apply SGD to a safety alert example and show it to find schemes that have fewer signals and make citizens' optimal actions more distinct compared to the known-commitment case.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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