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arXiv 2509.03357math.OC
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贝叶斯路由博弈中私人信息的最优性研究

On Optimality of Private Information in Bayesian Routing Games

Alexia Ambrogio, Leonardo Cianfanelli, Giacomo Como

AI总结:

该研究针对交通网络信息设计问题,提出通过全知规划者发送私人信号关联用户自利决策与网络状态,推导了特定网络结构下公平私人信号策略实现贝叶斯Wardrop均衡与系统最优一致的充要条件。

摘要:

我们研究了交通网络中的信息设计问题,该问题存在影响各路段通行时间的随机状态。旨在减少拥堵的全知系统规划者可观测网络状态的实现结果,并向用户发送私人信息——用户对网络状态持有共同先验但无法直接观测状态——以引导用户做出社会期望的行为。这些私人信号的预期作用是将用户的自利决策与网络状态相关联,使最终形成的贝叶斯Wardrop均衡与系统最优流量保持一致。我们的主要贡献是,在路段-路径关联矩阵为单射、且通行时间函数为仿射形式的交通网络中,给出了公平私人信号策略可实现最优性的充要条件。

英文摘要:

We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state realization and sends private messages to the users -- who share a common prior on the network state but do not observe it directly -- in order to nudge them towards a socially desirable behavior. The desired effect of these private signals is to correlate the users' selfish decisions with the network state and align the resulting Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium with the system optimum flow. Our main contribution is to provide sufficient and necessary conditions under which optimality may be achieved by a fair private signal policy in transportation networks with injective link-path incidence matrix and affine travel time functions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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