研究GPS行程数据对轨迹-用户关联攻击的脆弱性
Investigating Vulnerabilities of GPS Trip Data to Trajectory-User Linking Attacks
AI总结:
针对移除用户标识符的GPS行程数据集,提出新型轨迹-用户关联攻击以重建标识符,通过两个真实数据集验证即使移除标识符重新识别风险仍显著,截断机制无效,且频繁访问小众地点的用户更易被识别。
摘要:
开放的人类移动数据被视为向可持续移动和可持续城市规划转型所需的深入研究与分析的重要基础。近年来,骑行数据尤其成为数据收集工作的焦点。尽管位置数据的隐私风险广为人知,但从业者常因担心效用损失而避免使用高级隐私机制。从行程中移除用户标识符因此被认为是主要的隐私增益,因为这据称能防止通过关联单次行程获取完整移动模式。本文提出一种新型攻击,用于在由单次行程组成的GPS行程数据集中重建用户标识符,这与以往致力于在签到数据背景下评估轨迹-用户关联的攻击不同。我们评估了此类数据集中用户剩余的隐私风险,来自两个真实世界数据集的实证结果显示,即使移除了个人标识符,重新识别的风险仍然显著,且截断作为一种简单的额外隐私机制可能无法有效保护用户隐私。进一步研究表明,频繁访问仅少数人访问的地点的用户,往往更容易受到重新识别的影响。
英文摘要:
Open human mobility data is considered an essential basis for the profound research and analysis required for the transition to sustainable mobility and sustainable urban planning. Cycling data has especially been the focus of data collection endeavors in recent years. Although privacy risks regarding location data are widely known, practitioners often refrain from advanced privacy mechanisms to prevent utility losses. Removing user identifiers from trips is thereby deemed a major privacy gain, as it supposedly prevents linking single trips to obtain entire movement patterns. In this paper, we propose a novel attack to reconstruct user identifiers in GPS trip datasets consisting of single trips, unlike previous ones that are dedicated to evaluating trajectory-user linking in the context of check-in data. We evaluate the remaining privacy risk for users in such datasets and our empirical findings from two real-world datasets show that the risk of re-identification is significant even when personal identifiers have been removed, and that truncation as a simple additional privacy mechanism may not be effective in protecting user privacy. Further investigations indicate that users who frequently visit locations that are only visited by a small number of others, tend to be more vulnerable to re-identification.
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