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arXiv 1404.1986cs.CR
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攻击树构建与维护自动化的可行性研究

Towards Automating the Construction & Maintenance of Attack Trees: a Feasibility Study

Stéphane Paul

摘要:

安全风险管理可以应用于明确定义的或现有的系统;在这种情况下,目标是确定现有的漏洞,评估风险并提供适当的对策。安全风险管理也可以在系统开发周期的早期应用,当时其结构还没有很好地确定;在这种情况下,目标是积极影响设计工作,以便从一开始就产生安全的结构。由于体系结构的不确定性以及保持风险评估研究和系统体系结构一致所需的多次往返,使得后一项工作变得困难。对于运行多年的大型项目尤其如此。本文讨论了在系统开发生命周期早期进行的风险评估研究所提出的问题。基于工业经验,它断言攻击树可以帮助解决与保护这些大型,持续变化的系统设计相关的人类认知可扩展性问题。然而,大的攻击树很难构建,甚至更难维护。因此,本文提出了一个系统的方法来自动化的建设和维护这样的大攻击树,基于系统的业务和逻辑架构,系统的传统风险评估研究和安全知识数据库。

英文摘要:

Security risk management can be applied on well-defined or existing systems; in this case, the objective is to identify existing vulnerabilities, assess the risks and provide for the adequate countermeasures. Security risk management can also be applied very early in the system's development life-cycle, when its architecture is still poorly defined; in this case, the objective is to positively influence the design work so as to produce a secure architecture from the start. The latter work is made difficult by the uncertainties on the architecture and the multiple round-trips required to keep the risk assessment study and the system architecture aligned. This is particularly true for very large projects running over many years. This paper addresses the issues raised by those risk assessment studies performed early in the system's development life-cycle. Based on industrial experience, it asserts that attack trees can help solve the human cognitive scalability issue related to securing those large, continuously-changing system-designs. However, big attack trees are difficult to build, and even more difficult to maintain. This paper therefore proposes a systematic approach to automate the construction and maintenance of such big attack trees, based on the system's operational and logical architectures, the system's traditional risk assessment study and a security knowledge database.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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