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arXiv 2501.03301cs.CRcs.AIcs.DCcs.LG

从稀疏聚合视角重新思考联邦推荐中的拜占庭鲁棒性

Rethinking Byzantine Robustness in Federated Recommendation from Sparse Aggregation Perspective

Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(北京邮电大学);China Telecom Bestpay(中国电信翼支付);Beihang University(北京航空航天大学);Sony AI(索尼人工智能)

Zhongjian Zhang, Mengmei Zhang, Xiao Wang, Lingjuan Lyu, Bo Yan, Junping Du, Chuan Shi

AI总结:

本文针对联邦推荐特有的稀疏聚合机制,重新定义拜占庭鲁棒性,并提出按攻击者知识与能力分类的 Spattack 攻击族,证明少数恶意客户端即可阻止收敛并突破防御。

摘要:

为了保护推荐系统中的用户隐私,基于联邦学习(FL)的联邦推荐(FR)应运而生,它将个人数据保留在本地客户端上并协同更新模型。与 FL 不同,FR 具有独特的稀疏聚合机制,其中每个物品的嵌入仅由部分客户端更新,而非一般 FL 密集聚合中的全部客户端。近年来,作为 FL 的一项基本原则,模型安全受到越来越多的关注,尤其是拜占庭攻击,即恶意客户端可以发送任意更新。探索 FR 的拜占庭鲁棒性问题尤为关键,因为在应用 FR 的领域(例如电子商务)中,恶意客户端可以通过注册新账户被轻易注入。然而,现有拜占庭相关工作忽视了 FR 独特的稀疏聚合,使其不适用于我们的问题。因此,我们首次尝试从稀疏聚合的视角研究针对 FR 的拜占庭攻击,这并非易事:尚不清楚如何在稀疏聚合下定义拜占庭鲁棒性,以及如何在知识/能力有限的情况下设计拜占庭攻击。本文中,我们通过将单个物品的聚合定义为最小执行单元,重新表述了稀疏聚合下的拜占庭鲁棒性。随后,我们提出了一系列名为 Spattack 的有效攻击策略,这些策略利用稀疏聚合中的漏洞,并按照攻击者的知识和能力进行分类。大量实验结果表明,Spattack 能够在仅有少数恶意客户端的情况下有效阻止收敛,甚至攻破防御,从而为保障 FR 系统安全敲响警钟。

英文摘要:

To preserve user privacy in recommender systems, federated recommendation (FR) based on federated learning (FL) emerges, keeping the personal data on the local client and updating a model collaboratively. Unlike FL, FR has a unique sparse aggregation mechanism, where the embedding of each item is updated by only partial clients, instead of full clients in a dense aggregation of general FL. Recently, as an essential principle of FL, model security has received increasing attention, especially for Byzantine attacks, where malicious clients can send arbitrary updates. The problem of exploring the Byzantine robustness of FR is particularly critical since in the domains applying FR, e.g., e-commerce, malicious clients can be injected easily by registering new accounts. However, existing Byzantine works neglect the unique sparse aggregation of FR, making them unsuitable for our problem. Thus, we make the first effort to investigate Byzantine attacks on FR from the perspective of sparse aggregation, which is non-trivial: it is not clear how to define Byzantine robustness under sparse aggregations and design Byzantine attacks under limited knowledge/capability. In this paper, we reformulate the Byzantine robustness under sparse aggregation by defining the aggregation for a single item as the smallest execution unit. Then we propose a family of effective attack strategies, named Spattack, which exploit the vulnerability in sparse aggregation and are categorized along the adversary's knowledge and capability. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that Spattack can effectively prevent convergence and even break down defenses under a few malicious clients, raising alarms for securing FR systems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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