尼尔森自由逻辑中确定描述词的二元量词
A Binary Quantifier for Definite Descriptions in Nelsonian Free Logic
AI总结:
本文在Nelson次协调逻辑N4及其负自由变体中考察并改进了Kürbis的二元量词I,给出嵌入函数、自然演绎系统和Kripke语义,以构造性假和次协调逻辑解决Russell确定描述词解释中的悖论问题。
摘要:
本工作考察并改进了Kürbis用于形式化确定描述词的二元量词I的方法,其中I$x[F,G]表示“这个F是G”。Kürbis首先在直觉主义逻辑及其负自由形式中考察了I。众所周知,直觉主义推理以构造性方式逼近真。我们还想追随Nelson的脚步,以构造性方式逼近假。在Nelson的次协调逻辑N4及其负自由变体的语境中,我们考察了I。我们提供了一个从Nelson(自由)逻辑到直觉主义(自由)逻辑的嵌入函数,以及一个配备了I的Nelson(自由)逻辑的自然演绎系统和相应的Kripke风格语义。我们的方法不仅产生了构造性假,而且还为与Russell对确定描述词的解释有关的一个问题提供了另一种解决方案。这种理解可能导致悖论。通常用于解决这一问题的自由逻辑不足以产生矛盾。相反,我们采用次协调逻辑,它被设计为在存在矛盾数据的情况下工作,而不会贬低推理过程的价值。
英文摘要:
The method Kürbis used to formalise definite descriptions with a binary quantifier I, such that I$x[F,G]$ indicates `the F is G', is examined and improved upon in this work. Kürbis first looked at I in intuitionistic logic and its negative free form. It is well-known that intuitionistic reasoning approaches truth constructively. We also want to approach falsehood constructively, in Nelson's footsteps. Within the context of Nelson's paraconsistent logic N4 and its negative free variant, we examine I. We offer an embedding function from Nelson's (free) logic into intuitionistic (free) logic, as well as a natural deduction system for Nelson's (free) logic supplied with I and Kripke style semantics for it. Our method not only yields constructive falsehood, but also provides an alternate resolution to an issue pertaining to Russell's interpretation of definite descriptions. This comprehension might result in paradoxes. Free logic, which is often used to solve this issue, is insufficiently powerful to produce contradictions. Instead, we employ paraconsistent logic, which is made to function in the presence of contradicting data without devaluing the process of reasoning.
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