arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2411.04533cs.CVcs.LGstat.AP

对抗攻击检测的神经指纹

Neural Fingerprints for Adversarial Attack Detection

The Hebrew University(希伯来大学);Tel Aviv University(特拉维夫大学)

Haim Fisher, Moni Shahar, Yehezkel S. Resheff

AI总结:

本文提出基于神经指纹的随机化检测器库,通过采样神经元子集和似然比检验,在白盒设置下实现对对抗样本的高效检测,在ImageNet上达到近乎完美的性能。

摘要:

近年来,用于图像分类的深度学习模型已成为标准工具。这些模型的一个众所周知的安全漏洞是它们容易受到对抗样本的影响。对抗样本是通过略微改变某个类别图像的方式生成的,这种改变对人类来说难以察觉,但会导致模型将其错误分类为另一个类别。许多算法已被提出以解决这一问题,通常分为两大类:(i)构建鲁棒分类器;(ii)直接检测被攻击的图像。尽管这些检测器性能良好,但我们认为在白盒设置下,即攻击者知道网络和检测器的配置及权重时,他们可以通过在本地副本上运行大量样本来绕过检测器,并且仅将未被检测到的样本发送给实际模型。这个问题在安全应用中很常见,即使一个非常好的模型也不足以确保安全性。在本文中,我们提出通过随机化来克服任何静态防御的这种固有限制。为此,必须生成一个具有一致性能的非常大的检测器家族,并为每个输入随机选择一个或多个检测器。对于单个检测器,我们建议使用神经指纹方法。在训练阶段,对于每个类别,我们反复从网络的某些层中采样一个微小的随机神经元子集,如果这些神经元的平均值在焦点类别的干净图像和攻击图像之间足够不同,则它们被视为一个指纹并添加到检测器库中。在测试时,我们从与模型预测标签相关联的库中采样指纹,并使用似然比检验来检测攻击。我们在ImageNet上使用不同的攻击方法和模型架构评估了我们的检测器,并展示了近乎完美的检测性能以及较低的误检率。

英文摘要:

Deep learning models for image classification have become standard tools in recent years. A well known vulnerability of these models is their susceptibility to adversarial examples. These are generated by slightly altering an image of a certain class in a way that is imperceptible to humans but causes the model to classify it wrongly as another class. Many algorithms have been proposed to address this problem, falling generally into one of two categories: (i) building robust classifiers (ii) directly detecting attacked images. Despite the good performance of these detectors, we argue that in a white-box setting, where the attacker knows the configuration and weights of the network and the detector, they can overcome the detector by running many examples on a local copy, and sending only those that were not detected to the actual model. This problem is common in security applications where even a very good model is not sufficient to ensure safety. In this paper we propose to overcome this inherent limitation of any static defence with randomization. To do so, one must generate a very large family of detectors with consistent performance, and select one or more of them randomly for each input. For the individual detectors, we suggest the method of neural fingerprints. In the training phase, for each class we repeatedly sample a tiny random subset of neurons from certain layers of the network, and if their average is sufficiently different between clean and attacked images of the focal class they are considered a fingerprint and added to the detector bank. During test time, we sample fingerprints from the bank associated with the label predicted by the model, and detect attacks using a likelihood ratio test. We evaluate our detectors on ImageNet with different attack methods and model architectures, and show near-perfect detection with low rates of false detection.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑