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arXiv 2410.01871cs.GTcs.AIcs.CYecon.GNq-fin.EC
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基于拍卖的人工智能监管

Auction-Based Regulation for Artificial Intelligence

Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA(马里兰大学计算机科学系,College Park, MD, USA);SAP Labs, LLC(SAP实验室);Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, FL, USA(佛罗里达大学计算机科学系,FL, USA)

Marco Bornstein, Zora Che, Suhas Julapalli, Abdirisak Mohamed, Amrit Singh Bedi, Furong Huang

AI总结:

本文提出基于拍卖的AI监管机制,通过数学框架激励企业部署合规模型并参与监管,实验证明其在提升合规率和参与率方面优于传统方法。

摘要:

在

英文摘要:

In an era of "moving fast and breaking things", regulators have moved slowly to pick up the safety, bias, and legal debris left in the wake of broken Artificial Intelligence (AI) deployment. While there is much-warranted discussion about how to address the safety, bias, and legal woes of state-of-the-art AI models, rigorous and realistic mathematical frameworks to regulate AI are lacking. Our paper addresses this challenge, proposing an auction-based regulatory mechanism that provably incentivizes agents (i) to deploy compliant models and (ii) to participate in the regulation process. We formulate AI regulation as an all-pay auction where enterprises submit models for approval. The regulator enforces compliance thresholds and further rewards models exhibiting higher compliance than their peers. We derive Nash Equilibria demonstrating that rational agents will submit models exceeding the prescribed compliance threshold. Empirical results show that our regulatory auction boosts compliance rates by 20% and participation rates by 15% compared to baseline regulatory mechanisms, outperforming simpler frameworks that merely impose minimum compliance standards.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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