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arXiv 0904.1258cs.AIcs.MA
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关于拍卖机制设计的调研报告

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

The Graduate School and University Center(研究生中心与大学中心);The City University of New York(纽约市立大学);Brooklyn College(布鲁克林学院)

Jinzhong Niu, Simon Parsons

摘要:

拍卖是一个有着严格规定的市场,这些规定管理着市场上交易者可以获得的信息以及他们可以采取的行动。由于设计良好的拍卖可以获得理想的经济结果,因此它们被广泛用于解决现实世界的优化问题,以及构建股票或期货交易所。拍卖也为经济理论提供了一个非常有价值的试验场,它们在基于计算机的控制系统中发挥着重要作用。拍卖机制设计的目的是操纵拍卖规则以达到特定的目标。经济学家传统上使用数学方法,主要是博弈论,来分析拍卖和设计新的拍卖形式。然而,由于拍卖的高度复杂性,数学模型通常被简化以获得结果,并且这使得难以将从这样的模型导出的结果应用于现实世界中的市场环境。因此,研究人员正在转向实证方法。本报告旨在综述拍卖机制和交易策略设计的理论和实证方法,并对实证方法进行更多的权重,为该领域的进一步研究奠定基础。

英文摘要:

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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