时间常数:利用信息物理系统中设备与过程的瞬态响应进行执行器指纹识别
Time Constant: Actuator Fingerprinting using Transient Response of Device and Process in ICS
AI总结:
针对信息物理系统中的命令注入和重放攻击,提出名为 Time Constant 的执行器指纹技术,通过捕获设备与物理过程的瞬态动态特性构建防复制指纹,在真实水处理测试台和运行工厂中验证了其能有效区分过程状态与执行器并实现实时攻击检测。
摘要:
命令注入和重放攻击是信息物理系统(CPS)面临的主要威胁。我们开发了一种名为 Time Constant 的新型执行器指纹技术。Time Constant 捕获执行器和物理过程的瞬态动态。该瞬态行为具有设备特定性。我们结合过程与设备的瞬态特性,开发出一种防复制的执行器指纹,在面对内部攻击者时能抵抗命令注入和重放攻击。我们在来自真实水处理测试台的数据上验证了所提方案,并通过在运行工厂中的实时攻击检测进行了验证。结果表明,我们能够基于其 Time Constant 唯一区分过程状态和执行器。
英文摘要:
Command injection and replay attacks are key threats in Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). We develop a novel actuator fingerprinting technique named Time Constant. Time Constant captures the transient dynamics of an actuator and physical process. The transient behavior is device-specific. We combine process and device transient characteristics to develop a copy-resistant actuator fingerprint that resists command injection and replay attacks in the face of insider adversaries. We validated the proposed scheme on data from a real water treatment testbed, as well as through real-time attack detection in the live plant. Our results show that we can uniquely distinguish between process states and actuators based on their Time Constant.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。