伪随机码的新构造
New constructions of pseudorandom codes
AI总结:
本文研究了伪随机纠错码(PRC)的鲁棒性假设,基于planted hyperloop和Goldreich PRG假设构造公钥PRC,扩展原构造的假设基础,并首次提出对空间受限敌手无条件安全的私钥PRC。
摘要:
伪随机纠错码(PRC)是[CG24]中引入的一种新型密码学原语,可应用于生成式AI模型的水印。此类码中,多项式数量的码字集合对于无密钥的敌手在计算上与随机不可区分,但持有密钥者能高效解码受损码字。本文研究了存在对常数错误率具有鲁棒性的PRC所需的假设:1. 证明若[BKR23]的planted hyperloop假设与某版Goldreich PRG的安全性成立,则存在公钥PRC,高效敌手区分多项式数量码字与随机的优势不超过$o(1)$。2. 重新审视[CG24]的构造,表明其可基于更广泛假设。为此引入planted XOR假设的弱化版本(weak planted XOR假设),该假设可能具独立研究价值。3. 开创性研究对空间受限敌手安全的PRC,构造了长度$O(n)$的私钥PRC,在$\text{poly}(n)$时间、$O(n^{1.5-\varepsilon})$空间敌手下无条件与随机不可区分。
英文摘要:
Introduced in [CG24], pseudorandom error-correcting codes (PRCs) are a new cryptographic primitive with applications in watermarking generative AI models. These are codes where a collection of polynomially many codewords is computationally indistinguishable from random for an adversary that does not have the secret key, but anyone with the secret key is able to efficiently decode corrupted codewords. In this work, we examine the assumptions under which PRCs with robustness to a constant error rate exist. 1. We show that if both the planted hyperloop assumption introduced in [BKR23] and security of a version of Goldreich's PRG hold, then there exist public-key PRCs for which no efficient adversary can distinguish a polynomial number of codewords from random with better than $o(1)$ advantage. 2. We revisit the construction of [CG24] and show that it can be based on a wider range of assumptions than presented in [CG24]. To do this, we introduce a weakened version of the planted XOR assumption which we call the weak planted XOR assumption and which may be of independent interest. 3. We initiate the study of PRCs which are secure against space-bounded adversaries. We show how to construct secret-key PRCs of length $O(n)$ which are $\textit{unconditionally}$ indistinguishable from random by $\text{poly}(n)$ time, $O(n^{1.5-\varepsilon})$ space adversaries.
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