受约束公共决策的比例性
Proportionality for Constrained Public Decisions
AI总结：
本文研究选民在相互关联的公共议题上的比例决策，证明经典公理仅对受限议程可满足，并调整比例规则及价格可负担性概念以实现近似比例性。
摘要：
我们研究了一组选民需要在多个公共议题上做出集体决策的情形，其目标是获得一个以比例方式反映选民意见的结果。我们关注的是相互关联的公共决策，其中对一个或多个议题的结果会对议程中其他议题的接受或拒绝产生影响。我们表明，经典的有理由代表公理在此丰富情境下的适应性仅对受限类别的公共议程总是可满足的。我们调整了众所周知的比例决策规则以考虑公共议程的结构，并表明它们在一类表达性约束上近似地匹配有理由代表性质。我们还通过调整价格可负担性的概念，识别了在相互关联议题上实现比例性的另一条途径。
英文摘要：
We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected public decisions, where the outcome on one or more issues has repercussions on the acceptance or rejection of other issues in the agenda. We show that the adaptation of classical justified-representation axioms to this enriched setting are always satisfiable only for restricted classes of public agendas. We adapt well-known proportional decision rules to take the structure of the public agenda into account, and we show that they match justified-representation properties in approximation on a class of expressive constraints. We also identify another path to achieving proportionality on interconnected issues via an adaptation of the notion of priceability.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
