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arXiv 2408.16984cs.AI
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超越AI对齐中的偏好

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

MIT(麻省理工学院);UC Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);University College London(伦敦大学学院);University of Cambridge(剑桥大学)

Tan Zhi-Xuan, Micah Carroll, Matija Franklin, Hal Ashton

AI总结:

本文挑战AI对齐中偏好主义的主流假设,指出偏好与效用表示的局限,提出AI系统应依据其社会角色相关的规范性标准对齐,并由利益攸关方协商确定。

摘要:

AI对齐的主流实践假设:(1)偏好是人类价值观的充分表示;(2)人类理性可以理解为最大化偏好的满足;(3)AI系统应与一个或多个人类的偏好对齐,以确保其行为安全并符合我们的价值观。无论这些承诺是被隐含遵循还是明确支持,它们构成了我们所称的AI对齐的偏好主义方法。在本文中,我们描述并挑战偏好主义方法,并阐述值得进一步研究的概念性和技术性替代方案。我们首先调查理性选择理论作为描述性模型的局限性,解释偏好如何无法捕捉人类价值观的厚实语义内容,以及效用表示如何忽视这些价值观可能存在的不可通约性。然后,我们批判期望效用理论(EUT)对人类和AI的规范性,借鉴论证表明理性主体不必遵守EUT,同时强调EUT对哪些偏好具有规范性可接受性保持沉默。最后,我们认为这些局限性促使重新构建AI对齐的目标:AI系统不应与人类用户、开发者或全体人类的偏好对齐,而应与适合其社会角色的规范性标准对齐,例如通用助手的角色。此外,这些标准应由所有相关利益攸关方协商并达成一致。在这种对齐的替代概念下,多种AI系统将能够服务于多样化目的,与促进互利并限制伤害的规范性标准对齐,尽管我们的价值观多元且存在分歧。

英文摘要:

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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