RollingCache：利用运行时行为防御缓存侧信道攻击
RollingCache: Using Runtime Behavior to Defend Against Cache Side Channel Attacks
AI总结：
本文提出RollingCache缓存设计，通过全缓存运行时行为控制的动态映射改变争用地址集合，无需地址加密或缓存分区即可防御同核或跨核争用攻击，在SPEC-2017混合负载下性能开销仅1.67%。
摘要：
共享缓存极易因缓存组中的争用而遭受侧信道攻击。这些侧信道不仅是信息泄露的简单来源，还构成了有用的组件，用于发起更复杂的攻击，从而危及共享系统的安全。争用攻击利用的根本设计特征是，争用同一缓存组的地址集合具有确定性。在本文中，我们提出了RollingCache，这是一种通过动态改变争用缓存组的地址集合来防御争用攻击的缓存设计。与先前的防御机制不同，RollingCache不依赖地址加密/解密、数据重定位或缓存分区。我们使用一级间接寻址来实现由全缓存运行时行为控制的动态映射。我们的解决方案不依赖于已定义的安全域，并且能够防御在相同或不同核心上运行的攻击者。我们使用SPEC-2017基准测试套件在ChampSim上评估了RollingCache。安全评估表明，我们的动态映射消除了识别争用来源的确定性能力。性能评估显示，在混合工作负载上影响为1.67%，并产生相应的
英文摘要：
Shared caches are vulnerable to side channel attacks through contention in cache sets. Besides being a simple source of information leak, these side channels form useful gadgets for more sophisticated attacks that compromise the security of shared systems. The fundamental design aspect that contention attacks exploit is the deterministic nature of the set of addresses contending for a cache set. In this paper, we present RollingCache, a cache design that defends against contention attacks by dynamically changing the set of addresses contending for cache sets. Unlike prior defenses, RollingCache does not rely on address encryption/decryption, data relocation, or cache partitioning. We use one level of indirection to implement dynamic mapping controlled by the whole-cache runtime behavior. Our solution does not depend on having defined security domains, and can defend against an attacker running on the same or another core. We evaluate RollingCache on ChampSim using the SPEC-2017 benchmark suite. Our security evaluation shows that our dynamic mapping removes the deterministic ability to identify the source of contention. The performance evaluation shows an impact of 1.67\% over a mix of workloads, with a corresponding
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