This paper investigates the convergence properties of sample-average approximations (SAA) for set-valued systemic risk measures. We assume that the systemic risk measure is defined using a general aggregation function with some continuity properties and value-at-risk applied as a monetary risk measure. We focus on the theoretical convergence of its SAA under Wijsman and Hausdorff topologies for closed sets. After building the general theory, we provide an in-depth study of an important special case where the aggregation function is defined based on the Eisenberg-Noe network model. In this case, we provide mixed-integer programming formulations for calculating the SAA sets via their weighted-sum and norm-minimizing scalarizations. To demonstrate the applicability of our findings, we conduct a comprehensive sensitivity analysis by generating a financial network based on the preferential attachment model and modeling the economic disruptions via a Pareto distribution.
The ongoing concern about systemic risk since the outburst of the global financial crisis has highlighted the need for risk measures at the level of sets of interconnected financial components, such as portfolios, institutions or members of clearing houses. The two main issues in systemic risk measurement are the computation of an overall reserve level and its allocation to the different components according to their systemic relevance. We develop here a pragmatic approach to systemic risk measurement and allocation based on multivariate shortfall risk measures, where acceptable allocations ar…
The paper provides a comprehensive overview of modeling and pricing cyber insurance and includes clear and easily understandable explanations of the underlying mathematical concepts. We distinguish three main types of cyber risks: idiosyncratic, systematic, and systemic cyber risks. While for idiosyncratic and systematic cyber risks, classical actuarial and financial mathematics appear to be well-suited, systemic cyber risks require more sophisticated approaches that capture both network and strategic interactions. In the context of pricing cyber insurance policies, issues of interdependence a…
We axiomatically introduce risk-consistent conditional systemic risk measures defined on multidimensional risks. This class consists of those conditional systemic risk measures which can be decomposed into a state-wise conditional aggregation and a univariate conditional risk measure. Our studies extend known results for unconditional risk measures on finite state spaces. We argue in favor of a conditional framework on general probability spaces for assessing systemic risk. Mathematically, the problem reduces to selecting a realization of a random field with suitable properties. Moreover, our …
In our previous paper, "A Unified Approach to Systemic Risk Measures via Acceptance Set" (\textit{Mathematical Finance, 2018}), we have introduced a general class of systemic risk measures that allow for random allocations to individual banks before aggregation of their risks. In the present paper, we prove the dual representation of a particular subclass of such systemic risk measures and the existence and uniqueness of the optimal allocation related to them. We also introduce an associated utility maximization problem which has the same optimal solution as the systemic risk measure. In addit…
The inability to see and quantify systemic financial risk comes at an immense social cost. Systemic risk in the financial system arises to a large extent as a consequence of the interconnectedness of its institutions, which are linked through networks of different types of financial contracts, such as credit, derivatives, foreign exchange and securities. The interplay of the various exposure networks can be represented as layers in a financial multi-layer network. In this work we quantify the daily contributions to systemic risk from four layers of the Mexican banking system from 2007-2013. We…
Systemic risk arises as a multi-layer network phenomenon. Layers represent direct financial exposures of various types, including interbank liabilities, derivative- or foreign exchange exposures. Another network layer of systemic risk emerges through common asset holdings of financial institutions. Strongly overlapping portfolios lead to similar exposures that are caused by price movements of the underlying financial assets. Based on the knowledge of portfolio holdings of financial agents we quantify systemic risk of overlapping portfolios. We present an optimization procedure, where we minimi…
Foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the bank's contributions to systemic risk. Interest rate derivatives decrease it. The proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and the leverage ratio have stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings.
We survey systemic risks to financial markets and present a high-level description of an algorithm that measures systemic risk in terms of coupled networks.
Systemic risk refers to the risk that the financial system is susceptible to failures due to the characteristics of the system itself. The tremendous cost of systemic risk requires the design and implementation of tools for the efficient macroprudential regulation of financial institutions. The current paper proposes a novel approach to measuring systemic risk. Key to our construction is a rigorous derivation of systemic risk measures from the structure of the underlying system and the objectives of a financial regulator. The suggested systemic risk measures express systemic risk in terms of c…
We introduce the possibility of default in the mean field game of mutual holding of Djete and Touzi [11]. This is modeled by introducing absorption at the origin of the equity process. We provide an explicit solution of this mean field game. Moreover, we provide a particle system approximation, and we derive an autonomous equation for the time evolution of the default probability, or equivalently the law of the hitting time of the origin by the equity process. The systemic risk is thus described by the evolution of the default probability.
We present a network-based framework for simulating systemic risk that considers shock propagation in banking systems. In particular, the framework allows the modeller to reflect a top-down framework where a shock to one bank in the system affects the solvency and liquidity position of other banks, through systemic market risks and consequential liquidity strains. We illustrate the framework with an application using South African bank balance sheet data. Spikes in simulated assessments of systemic risk agree closely with spikes in documented subjective assessments of this risk. This indicates…
We discuss the systemic risk implied by the interbank exposures reconstructed with the maximum entropy method. The maximum entropy method severely underestimates the risk of interbank contagion by assuming a fully connected network, while in reality the structure of the interbank network is sparsely connected. Here, we formulate an algorithm for sparse network reconstruction, and we show numerically that it provides a more reliable estimation of the systemic risk.
We provide an overview of the relationship between financial networks and systemic risk. We present a taxonomy of different types of systemic risk, differentiating between direct externalities between financial organizations (e.g., defaults, correlated portfolios and firesales), and perceptions and feedback effects (e.g., bank runs, credit freezes). We also discuss optimal regulation and bailouts, measurements of systemic risk and financial centrality, choices by banks' regarding their portfolios and partnerships, and the changing nature of financial networks.
We consider a system of diffusion processes that interact through their empirical mean and have a stabilizing force acting on each of them, corresponding to a bistable potential. There are three parameters that characterize the system: the strength of the intrinsic stabilization, the strength of the external random perturbations, and the degree of cooperation or interaction between them. The latter is the rate of mean reversion of each component to the empirical mean of the system. We interpret this model in the context of systemic risk and analyze in detail the effect of cooperation between t…
We establish dual representations for systemic risk measures based on acceptance sets in a general setting. We deal with systemic risk measures of both "first allocate, then aggregate" and "first aggregate, then allocate" type. In both cases, we provide a detailed analysis of the corresponding systemic acceptance sets and their support functions. The same approach delivers a simple and self-contained proof of the dual representation of utility-based risk measures for univariate positions.
Evaluation of systemic risk in networks of financial institutions in general requires information of inter-institution financial exposures. In the framework of Debt Rank algorithm, we introduce an approximate method of systemic risk evaluation which requires only node properties, such as total assets and liabilities, as inputs. We demonstrate that this approximation captures a large portion of systemic risk measured by Debt Rank. Furthermore, using Monte Carlo simulations, we investigate network structures that can amplify systemic risk. Indeed, while no topology in general sense is {\em a pri…
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) analyze systemic risk for financial institutions linked by a network of liabilities. They show that the solution to their model is unique when the financial system is satisfies a regularity condition involving risk orbits. We show that this condition is not needed: a unique solution always exists.
Since the latest financial crisis, the idea of systemic risk has received considerable interest. In particular, contagion effects arising from cross-holdings between interconnected financial firms have been studied extensively. Drawing inspiration from the field of complex networks, these attempts are largely unaware of models and theories for credit risk of individual firms. Here, we note that recent network valuation models extend the seminal structural risk model of Merton (1974). Furthermore, we formally compute sensitivities to various risk factors -- commonly known as Greeks -- in a netw…
In this paper, we introduce the rich classes of conditional distortion (CoD) risk measures and distortion risk contribution ($Δ$CoD) measures as measures of systemic risk and analyze their properties and representations. The classes include the well-known conditional Value-at-Risk, conditional Expected Shortfall, and risk contribution measures in terms of the VaR and ES as special cases. Sufficient conditions are presented for two random vectors to be ordered by the proposed CoD-risk measures and distortion risk contribution measures. These conditions are expressed using the conventional stoch…
We provide a framework for detecting relevant insurance companies in a systemic risk perspective. Among the alternative methodologies for measuring systemic risk, we propose a complex network approach where insurers are linked to form a global interconnected system. We model the reciprocal influence between insurers calibrating edge weights on the basis of specific risk measures. Therefore, we provide a suitable network indicator, the Weighted Effective Resistance Centrality, able to catch which is the effect of a specific vertex on the network robustness. By means of this indicator, we assess…
The financial crisis has dramatically demonstrated that the traditional approach to apply univariate monetary risk measures to single institutions does not capture sufficiently the perilous systemic risk that is generated by the interconnectedness of the system entities and the corresponding contagion effects. This has brought awareness of the urgent need for novel approaches that capture systemic riskiness. The purpose of this paper is to specify a general methodological framework that is flexible enough to cover a wide range of possibilities to design systemic risk measures via multi-dimensi…
The goal of this paper is to study organized flocking behavior and systemic risk in heterogeneous mean-field interacting diffusions. We illustrate in a number of case studies the effect of heterogeneity in the behavior of systemic risk in the system, i.e., the risk that several agents default simultaneously as a result of interconnections. We also investigate the effect of heterogeneity on the "flocking behavior" of different agents, i.e., when agents with different dynamics end up following very similar paths and follow closely the mean behavior of the system. Using Laplace asymptotics, we de…
Management of systemic risk in financial markets is traditionally associated with setting (higher) capital requirements for market participants. There are indications that while equity ratios have been increased massively since the financial crisis, systemic risk levels might not have lowered, but even increased. It has been shown that systemic risk is to a large extent related to the underlying network topology of financial exposures. A natural question arising is how much systemic risk can be eliminated by optimally rearranging these networks and without increasing capital requirements. Over…
Financial markets are exposed to systemic risk, the risk that a substantial fraction of the system ceases to function and collapses. Systemic risk can propagate through different mechanisms and channels of contagion. One important form of financial contagion arises from indirect interconnections between financial institutions mediated by financial markets. This indirect interconnection occurs when financial institutions invest in common assets and is referred to as overlapping portfolios. In this work we quantify systemic risk from indirect interconnections between financial institutions. Havi…
The downside risk of a portfolio of (equity)assets is generally substantially higher than the downside risk of its components. In particular in times of crises when assets tend to have high correlation, the understanding of this difference can be crucial in managing systemic risk of a portfolio. In this paper we generalize Merton's option formula in the presence jumps to the multi-asset case. It is shown how common jumps across assets provide an intuitive and powerful tool to describe systemic risk that is consistent with data. The methodology provides a new way to mark and risk-manage systemi…
Excessive leverage, i.e. the abuse of debt financing, is considered one of the primary factors in the default of financial institutions. Systemic risk results from correlations between individual default probabilities that cannot be considered independent. Based on the structural framework by Merton (1974), we discuss a model in which these correlations arise from overlaps in banks' portfolios. Portfolio diversification is used as a strategy to mitigate losses from investments in risky projects. We calculate an optimal level of diversification that has to be reached for a given level of excess…
Systemic risk in banking systems remains a crucial issue that it has not been completely understood. In our toy model, banks are exposed to two sources of risks, namely, market risk from their investments in assets external to the banking system and credit risk from their lending in the interbank market. By and large, both risks increase during severe financial turmoil. Under this scenario, the paper shows the conditions under which both the individual and the systemic default tend to coincide.
Financial markets are exposed to systemic risk (SR), the risk that a major fraction of the system ceases to function, and collapses. It has recently become possible to quantify SR in terms of underlying financial networks where nodes represent financial institutions, and links capture the size and maturity of assets (loans), liabilities, and other obligations, such as derivatives. We demonstrate that it is possible to quantify the share of SR that individual liabilities within a financial network contribute to the overall SR. We use empirical data of nationwide interbank liabilities to show th…
Assessing systemic risk in financial markets is of great importance but it often requires data that are unavailable or available at a very low frequency. For this reason, systemic risk assessment with partial information is potentially very useful for regulators and other stakeholders. In this paper we consider systemic risk due to fire sales spillover and portfolio rebalancing by using the risk metrics defined by Greenwood et al. (2015). By using the Maximum Entropy principle we propose a method to assess aggregated and single bank's systemicness and vulnerability and to statistically test fo…
The financial crisis showed the importance of measuring, allocating and regulating systemic risk. Recently, the systemic risk measures that can be decomposed into an aggregation function and a scalar measure of risk, received a lot of attention. In this framework, capital allocations are added after aggregation and can represent bailout costs. More recently, a framework has been introduced, where institutions are supplied with capital allocations before aggregation. This yields an interpretation that is particularly useful for regulatory purposes. In each framework, the set of all feasible cap…
We extend the Vasiček loan portfolio model to a setting where liabilities fluctuate randomly and asset values may be subject to systemic jump risk. We derive the probability distribution of the percentage loss of a uniform portfolio and analyze its properties. We find that the impact of liability risk is ambiguous and depends on the correlation between the continuous aggregate factor and the asset-liability ratio as well as on the default intensity. We also find that systemic jump risk has a significant impact on the upper percentiles of the loss distribution and, therefore, on both the VaR-me…
Risk diversification is the basis of insurance and investment. It is thus crucial to study the effects that could limit it. One of them is the existence of systemic risk that affects all the policies at the same time. We introduce here a probabilistic approach to examine the consequences of its presence on the risk loading of the premium of a portfolio of insurance policies. This approach could be easily generalized for investment risk. We see that, even with a small probability of occurrence, systemic risk can reduce dramatically the diversification benefits. It is clearly revealed via a non-…
We propose a new methodology based on the Marshall-Olkin (MO) copula to model cross-border systemic risk. The proposed framework estimates the impact of the systematic and idiosyncratic components on systemic risk. Initially, we propose a maximum-likelihood method to estimate the parameter of the MO copula. In order to use the data on non-distressed banks for these estimates, we consider times to bank failures as censored samples. Hence, we propose an estimation procedure for the MO copula on censored data. The empirical evidence from European banks shows that the proposed censored model avoid…
Complex non-linear interactions between banks and assets we model by two time-dependent Erdős Renyi network models where each node, representing bank, can invest either to a single asset (model I) or multiple assets (model II). We use dynamical network approach to evaluate the collective financial failure---systemic risk---quantified by the fraction of active nodes. The systemic risk can be calculated over any future time period, divided on sub-periods, where within each sub-period banks may contiguously fail due to links to either (i) assets or (ii) other banks, controlled by two parameters, …
Financial regulatory agencies are struggling to manage the systemic risks attributed to negative economic shocks. Preventive interventions are prominent to eliminate the risks and help to build a more resilient financial system. Although tremendous efforts have been made to measure multi-risk severity levels, understand the contagion behaviors and other risk management problems, there still lacks a theoretical framework revealing what and how regulatory intervention measurements can mitigate systemic risk. Here we demonstrate regshock, a practical visual analytical approach to support the expl…
As it is known in the finance risk and macroeconomics literature, risk-sharing in large portfolios may increase the probability of creation of default clusters and of systemic risk. We review recent developments on mathematical and computational tools for the quantification of such phenomena. Limiting analysis such as law of large numbers and central limit theorems allow to approximate the distribution in large systems and study quantities such as the loss distribution in large portfolios. Large deviations analysis allow us to study the tail of the loss distribution and to identify pathways to…
This paper derives -- considering a Gaussian setting -- closed form solutions of the statistics that Adrian and Brunnermeier and Acharya et al. have suggested as measures of systemic risk to be attached to individual banks. The statistics equal the product of statistic specific Beta-coefficients with the mean corrected Value at Risk. Hence, the measures of systemic risks are closely related to well known concepts of financial economics. Another benefit of the analysis is that it is revealed how the concepts are related to each other. Also, it may be relatively easy to convince the regulators t…
This paper is dedicated to the consistency of systemic risk measures with respect to stochastic dependence. It compares two alternative notions of Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) available in the current literature. These notions are both based on the conditional distribution of a random variable Y given a stress event for a random variable X, but they use different types of stress events. We derive representations of these alternative CoVaR notions in terms of copulas, study their general dependence consistency and compare their performance in several stochastic models. Our central finding …
We model systemic risk using a common factor that accounts for market-wide shocks and a tail dependence factor that accounts for linkages among extreme stock returns. Specifically, our theoretical model allows for firm-specific impacts of infrequent and extreme events. Using data on the four sectors of the U.S. financial industry from 1996 to 2011, we uncover two key empirical findings. First, disregarding the effect of the tail dependence factor leads to a downward bias in the measurement of systemic risk, especially during weak economic times. Second, when these measures serve as leading ind…
The global financial system has become highly connected and complex. Has been proven in practice that existing models, measures and reports of financial risk fail to capture some important systemic dimensions. Only lately, advisory boards have been established in high level and regulations are directly targeted to systemic risk. In the same direction, a growing number of researchers employ network analysis to model systemic risk in financial networks. Current approaches are concentrated on interbank payment network flows in national and international level. This work builds on existing approac…
We consider a financial network represented at any time instance by a random liability graph which evolves over time. The agents connect through credit instruments borrowed from each other or through direct lending, and these create the liability edges. These random edges are modified (locally) by the agents over time, as they learn from their experiences and (possibly imperfect) observations. The settlement of the liabilities of various agents at the end of the contract period (at any time instance) can be expressed as solutions of random fixed point equations. Our first step is to derive the…
We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in a banking system model. The banking system model consists in an initial value problem for a system of stochastic differential equations whose dependent variables are the log-monetary reserves of the banks as functions of time. The banking system model considered generalizes previous models studied in [5], [4], [7] and describes an homogeneous population of banks. Two distinct mechanisms are used to model the cooperation among banks and the cooperation between banks and monetary authority. These mechanisms are regulated respectively by the p…
We contribute to the understanding of how systemic risk arises in a network of credit-interlinked agents. Motivated by empirical studies we formulate a network model which, despite its simplicity, depicts the nature of interbank markets better than a homogeneous model. The components of a vector Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process living on the vertices of the network describe the financial robustnesses of the agents. For this system, we prove a LLN for growing network size leading to a propagation of chaos result. We state properties, which arise from such a structure, and examine the effect of inhomo…
We study cascades on a two-layer multiplex network, with asymmetric feedback that depends on the coupling strength between the layers. Based on an analytical branching process approximation, we calculate the systemic risk measured by the final fraction of failed nodes on a reference layer. The results are compared with the case of a single layer network that is an aggregated representation of the two layers. We find that systemic risk in the two-layer network is smaller than in the aggregated one only if the coupling strength between the two layers is small. Above a critical coupling strength,…
We study insolvency cascades in an interbank system when banks are allowed to insure their loans with credit default swaps (CDS) sold by other banks. We show that, by properly shifting financial exposures from one institution to another, a CDS market can be designed to rewire the network of interbank exposures in a way that makes it more resilient to insolvency cascades. A regulator can use information about the topology of the interbank network to devise a systemic insurance surcharge that is added to the CDS spread. CDS contracts are thus effectively penalized according to how much they cont…
Banks in the interbank network can not assess the true risks associated with lending to other banks in the network, unless they have full information on the riskiness of all the other banks. These risks can be estimated by using network metrics (for example DebtRank) of the interbank liability network which is available to Central Banks. With a simple agent based model we show that by increasing transparency by making the DebtRank of individual nodes (banks) visible to all nodes, and by imposing a simple incentive scheme, that reduces interbank borrowing from systemically risky nodes, the syst…
The multivariate conditional probability distribution models the effects of a set of variables onto the statistical properties of another set of variables. In the study of systemic risk in a financial system, the multivariate conditional probability distribution can be used for stress-testing by quantifying the propagation of losses from a set of `stressing' variables to another set of `stressed' variables. In this paper I describe how to compute such conditional probability distributions for the vast family of multivariate elliptical distributions, and in particular for the multivariate Stude…
We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in an assets-liabilities dynamical model of banking system. In the model considered each bank is represented by its assets and its liabilities.The capital reserves of a bank are the difference between assets and liabilities of the bank. A bank is solvent when its capital reserves are greater or equal to zero otherwise the bank is failed.The banking system dynamics is defined by an initial value problem for a system of stochastic differential equations whose independent variable is time and whose dependent variables are the assets and the liabi…
