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arXiv 2408.07892cs.CY
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人格凭证:人工智能以及用于区分网络真实用户的隐私保护工具的价值

Personhood credentials: Artificial intelligence and the value of privacy-preserving tools to distinguish who is real online

Steven Adler, Zoë Hitzig, Shrey Jain, Catherine Brewer, Wayne Chang, Renée DiResta, Eddy Lazzarin, Sean McGregor, Wendy Seltzer, Divya Siddarth, Nouran Soliman,… 展开作者

Steven Adler, Zoë Hitzig, Shrey Jain, Catherine Brewer, Wayne Chang, Renée DiResta, Eddy Lazzarin, Sean McGregor, Wendy Seltzer, Divya Siddarth, Nouran Soliman, Tobin South, Connor Spelliscy, Manu Sporny, Varya Srivastava, John Bailey, Brian Christian, Andrew Critch, Ronnie Falcon, Heather Flanagan, Kim Hamilton Duffy, Eric Ho, Claire R. Leibowicz, Srikanth Nadhamuni, Alan Z. Rozenshtein, David Schnurr, Evan Shapiro, Lacey Strahm, Andrew Trask, Zoe Weinberg, Cedric Whitney, Tom Zick

AI总结:

针对AI时代网络匿名与可信平衡难题,本文提出可由多机构签发、无需生物识别的人格凭证(PHCs),在保护隐私前提下证明用户为真实人类,弥补现有反制手段的不足,并分析了其风险与落地路径。

摘要:

匿名性是网络空间的一项重要原则。然而,恶意行为者长期以来一直使用虚假身份实施欺诈、传播虚假信息并开展其他欺骗性活动。随着能力日益强大的AI出现,不良行为者可以扩大其操作的潜在规模并提升效果,加剧了网络空间平衡匿名性与可信度的挑战。本文中,我们分析了应对这一挑战的新型工具的价值:“人格凭证(PHCs)”,这是一种数字凭证,使用户能够在不披露任何个人信息的情况下,向网络服务证明自己是真实人类而非AI。这类凭证可由一系列可信机构(政府或其他机构)签发。根据我们的定义,PHC系统可以是本地的也可以是全球的,且无需基于生物识别技术。AI领域的两大趋势凸显了这一挑战的紧迫性:一是AI在网络上与人类的区分度越来越低(即逼真的内容和虚拟形象、智能体活动),二是AI的可扩展性不断提升(即成本效益、可及性)。借鉴匿名凭证和“人格证明”系统的长期研究历史,人格凭证为人们提供了在网络平台上彰显自身可信度的方式,也为服务提供商提供了减少不良行为者滥用行为的新工具。相比之下,现有的自动化欺骗反制措施(如CAPTCHA)不足以对抗复杂的AI,而严格的身份验证解决方案在许多场景下隐私保护性不足。在梳理了人格凭证的优势后,我们还探讨了部署风险和设计挑战。最后,我们为政策制定者、技术专家和标准机构提出了可供参考的可行后续步骤,相关制定需与公众协商推进。

英文摘要:

Anonymity is an important principle online. However, malicious actors have long used misleading identities to conduct fraud, spread disinformation, and carry out other deceptive schemes. With the advent of increasingly capable AI, bad actors can amplify the potential scale and effectiveness of their operations, intensifying the challenge of balancing anonymity and trustworthiness online. In this paper, we analyze the value of a new tool to address this challenge: "personhood credentials" (PHCs), digital credentials that empower users to demonstrate that they are real people -- not AIs -- to online services, without disclosing any personal information. Such credentials can be issued by a range of trusted institutions -- governments or otherwise. A PHC system, according to our definition, could be local or global, and does not need to be biometrics-based. Two trends in AI contribute to the urgency of the challenge: AI's increasing indistinguishability from people online (i.e., lifelike content and avatars, agentic activity), and AI's increasing scalability (i.e., cost-effectiveness, accessibility). Drawing on a long history of research into anonymous credentials and "proof-of-personhood" systems, personhood credentials give people a way to signal their trustworthiness on online platforms, and offer service providers new tools for reducing misuse by bad actors. In contrast, existing countermeasures to automated deception -- such as CAPTCHAs -- are inadequate against sophisticated AI, while stringent identity verification solutions are insufficiently private for many use-cases. After surveying the benefits of personhood credentials, we also examine deployment risks and design challenges. We conclude with actionable next steps for policymakers, technologists, and standards bodies to consider in consultation with the public.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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