竞争性企业污染监管的均值场博弈方法
A Mean Field Game approach for pollution regulation of competitive firms
AI总结:
本文用均值场博弈建模竞争性企业在总量管制与交易监管下的减排与交易行为,通过Riccati方程求得显式解,并揭示竞争程度对污染监管经济后果的关键影响。
摘要:
我们基于均值场博弈开发了一个模型,该模型描述的是根据标准AK模型生产相似商品、且资本折旧率会产生污染副产品的竞争性企业。我们的分析聚焦于广泛使用的总量管制与交易(cap-and-trade)污染监管。在此监管下,企业可通过实施污染减排、降低产出以及参与排放交易来灵活应对,同时监管者动态地向每家企业分配排放配额。由此产生的均值场博弈属于线性二次型,并等价于一个均值场型控制问题,即它是一个势博弈。我们通过求解Riccati型微分方程找到了该问题的显式解。进一步地,我们研究了满足市场出清条件的碳排放均衡价格,并找到了一个带共同噪声的McKean-Vlasov型前向-后向随机微分方程(FBSDE)的具体形式。该方程的解提供了一个近似均衡价格。此外,我们证明了竞争程度在决定污染监管的经济后果方面至关重要。
英文摘要:
We develop a model based on mean-field games of competitive firms producing similar goods according to a standard AK model with a depreciation rate of capital generating pollution as a byproduct. Our analysis focuses on the widely-used cap-and-trade pollution regulation. Under this regulation, firms have the flexibility to respond by implementing pollution abatement, reducing output, and participating in emission trading, while a regulator dynamically allocates emission allowances to each firm. The resulting mean-field game is of linear quadratic type and equivalent to a mean-field type control problem, i.e., it is a potential game. We find explicit solutions to this problem through the solutions to differential equations of Riccati type. Further, we investigate the carbon emission equilibrium price that satisfies the market clearing condition and find a specific form of FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type with common noise. The solution to this equation provides an approximate equilibrium price. Additionally, we demonstrate that the degree of competition is vital in determining the economic consequences of pollution regulation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。