区块构建中的搜索者竞争
Searcher Competition in Block Building
AI总结：
本文以核为解概念分析竞争性区块构建中搜索者竞争如何决定验证者与搜索者的 MEV 分配，并用 backrun 数据验证竞争越充分、提议者收益越高。
摘要：
我们在具有竞争性区块构建市场的区块链（例如 Ethereum）中，研究验证者所获取的最大可提取价值（MEV）数量，并将其表示为搜索者竞争的函数。我们认为，在这一背景下，核（core）是一个合适的解概念，因为它能够作出稳健预测，且这些预测独立于实现细节或所选择的特定机制。我们刻画了验证者在核中提取多少价值，并将验证者的剩余份额量化为搜索者竞争的函数。搜索者最多只能获得获胜区块相对于在没有其 bundles（交易束）时能够构建的最佳区块的边际价值增量。对偶地，这给出了验证者所提取价值的下界。如果套利机会很容易被发现，并且许多搜索者找到相似的 bundles，那么验证者几乎必然获得全部价值；而如果每个套利机会上的搜索者竞争很少，搜索者则可以获取大部分价值。此外，对于我们研究的被动区块提议者情形，我们研究了以占优策略实现核分配的机制，并发现对于次模价值，存在唯一的占优策略激励相容核选择机制，该机制给予每个搜索者恰好其对获胜区块的边际价值贡献。我们使用聚合 bundle 数据从经验上验证了理论预测，并发现针对同一机会提交的 backruns（后随交易）数量与提议者从该机会中获取的中位价值之间存在显著正相关关系。
英文摘要：
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution concept in this context that makes robust predictions that are independent of implementation details or specific mechanisms chosen. We characterize how much value validators extract in the core and quantify the surplus share of validators as a function of searcher competition. Searchers can obtain at most the marginal value increase of the winning block relative to the best block that can be built without their bundles. Dually this gives a lower bound on the value extracted by the validator. If arbitrages are easy to find and many searchers find similar bundles, the validator gets paid all value almost surely, while searchers can capture most value if there is little searcher competition per arbitrage. For the case of passive block-proposers we study, moreover, mechanisms that implement core allocations in dominant strategies and find that for submodular value, there is a unique dominant-strategy incentive compatible core-selecting mechanism that gives each searcher exactly their marginal value contribution to the winning block. We validate our theoretical prediction empirically with aggregate bundle data and find a significant positive relation between the number of submitted backruns for the same opportunity and the median value captured by the proposer from the opportunity.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
