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arXiv 2406.16812cs.GT
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图中的FlipDyn:图中的资源接管博弈

FlipDyn in Graphs: Resource Takeover Games in Graphs

Sandeep Banik, Shaunak D. Bopardikar, Naira Hovakimyan

AI总结:

本文提出图场景下的动态博弈模型FlipDyn-G,刻画攻防双方的节点接管策略交互,推导了一般系统及特定线性系统、马尔可夫链下的纳什均衡与鞍点值,并通过数值研究验证结果。

摘要:

我们提出了FlipDyn-G,这是一种将FlipDyn框架扩展到基于图的场景的动态博弈模型,其中每个节点代表一个动态系统。该模型刻画了防御者与对手之间的交互:双方会策略性地接管图中的节点,以最小化(对应最大化)有限时域加性成本。在任意时刻,FlipDyn状态由当前节点表示,每个参与者都可以根据当前节点的连通性,将FlipDyn状态转移到相邻节点。这类转移由节点动力学、状态以及与节点相关的成本驱动。该模型构成了一个混合动态系统,其中离散状态(即FlipDyn状态)支配着连续状态的演化以及相应的状态成本。我们的目标是计算图上这一有限时域零和博弈的纳什均衡。我们的贡献有两方面。第一,我们针对一般动态系统对FlipDyn-G博弈进行了建模与刻画,并给出了对应的纳什均衡(NE)接管策略。第二,对于带二次成本的标量线性离散时间动态系统,我们推导出了与系统连续状态无关的纳什均衡接管策略和鞍点值。此外,对于标量线性动态系统下的有限状态生灭马尔可夫链(以图的形式表示),我们推导出了纳什均衡接管策略和鞍点值的解析表达式。我们通过涉及流行病模型和带对抗交互的线性动态系统的数值研究,验证了我们的研究结果。

英文摘要:

We present \texttt{FlipDyn-G}, a dynamic game model extending the \texttt{FlipDyn} framework to a graph-based setting, where each node represents a dynamical system. This model captures the interactions between a defender and an adversary who strategically take over nodes in a graph to minimize (resp. maximize) a finite horizon additive cost. At any time, the \texttt{FlipDyn} state is represented as the current node, and each player can transition the \texttt{FlipDyn} state to a depending based on the connectivity from the current node. Such transitions are driven by the node dynamics, state, and node-dependent costs. This model results in a hybrid dynamical system where the discrete state (\texttt{FlipDyn} state) governs the continuous state evolution and the corresponding state cost. Our objective is to compute the Nash equilibrium of this finite horizon zero-sum game on a graph. Our contributions are two-fold. First, we model and characterize the \texttt{FlipDyn-G} game for general dynamical systems, along with the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) takeover strategies. Second, for scalar linear discrete-time dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state of the system. Additionally, for a finite state birth-death Markov chain (represented as a graph) under scalar linear dynamical systems, we derive analytical expressions for the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values. We illustrate our findings through numerical studies involving epidemic models and linear dynamical systems with adversarial interactions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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