FlipDyn 与控制:带动力学的资源接管博弈
FlipDyn with Control: Resource Takeover Games with Dynamics
AI总结:
本文提出带控制的 FlipDyn 零和资源接管博弈,推导其鞍点值与纳什均衡策略,并针对线性二次系统给出充分条件、参数化解及近似解,通过数值实验验证。
摘要:
我们引入了带控制的 FlipDyn,一个有限时域零和资源接管博弈,其中防御者和对手决定何时接管以及如何控制一个共同资源。在每个离散时间步,参与者可以接管或保持控制,产生依赖于状态和控制的成本。该系统被建模为一个混合动力系统,其中离散的 FlipDyn 状态决定控制权。我们的贡献是:(i)对于任意非负成本,我们推导出 FlipDyn 博弈的鞍点值以及相应的纳什均衡(NE)接管策略。(ii)对于具有二次成本的线性动力系统,我们建立了博弈存在 NE 的充分条件。(iii)对于具有二次成本的标量线性动力系统,我们推导出参数化的 NE 接管策略和与连续状态无关的鞍点值。(iv)对于具有二次成本的高维线性动力系统,我们推导出近似的 NE 接管策略和控制策略,并计算鞍点值的界。我们通过对线性系统的对抗控制的数值研究验证了我们的结果。
英文摘要:
We introduce FlipDyn with control, a finite-horizon zero-sum resource takeover game, where a defender and an adversary decide when to takeover and how to control a common resource. At each discrete-time step, the players can take over or retain control, incurring state and control-dependent costs. The system is modeled as a hybrid dynamical system, with a discrete \texttt{FlipDyn} state determining control authority. Our contributions are: (i) For arbitrary non-negative costs, we derive the saddle-point value of the \texttt{FlipDyn} game and the corresponding Nash equilibria (NE) takeover strategies. (ii) For linear dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we establish sufficient conditions under which the game admits an NE. (iii) For scalar linear dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive parameterized NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state. (iv) For higher-dimensional linear dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive approximate NE takeover strategies and control policies, and compute bounds on the saddle-point values. We validate our results through a numerical study on adversarial control of a linear system.
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