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arXiv 2406.02483eess.AScs.AIcs.SD

神经欺骗对策如何检测部分欺骗音频?

How Do Neural Spoofing Countermeasures Detect Partially Spoofed Audio?

National University of Singapore(新加坡国立大学);National Institute of Informatics(日本国立信息学研究所);Fortemedia Singapore(新加坡福迪美公司)

Tianchi Liu, Lin Zhang, Rohan Kumar Das, Yi Ma, Ruijie Tao, Haizhou Li

AI总结:

本研究利用Grad-CAM和定量分析指标解释部分欺骗音频检测中对策模型的决策过程,发现其优先关注拼接产生的过渡区域伪影,为模型设计和数据集创建提供了可解释性基础。

摘要:

部分操纵句子可以极大地改变其含义。最近的工作表明,在部分欺骗音频上训练的对策(CMs)能够有效检测此类欺骗。然而,目前对CMs决策过程的理解仍然有限。我们利用Grad-CAM并引入一种定量分析指标来解释CMs的决策。我们发现,CMs优先关注拼接真实和欺骗音频时产生的过渡区域伪影。这种关注点不同于在完全欺骗音频上训练的CMs,后者集中于真实和欺骗部分之间的模式差异。我们的进一步调查解释了CMs在做出正确或错误预测时关注点的变化本质。这些见解为CM模型的设计和数据集的创建提供了基础。此外,这项工作为先前未被充分探索的部分欺骗音频检测领域的可解释性奠定了基础。

英文摘要:

Partially manipulating a sentence can greatly change its meaning. Recent work shows that countermeasures (CMs) trained on partially spoofed audio can effectively detect such spoofing. However, the current understanding of the decision-making process of CMs is limited. We utilize Grad-CAM and introduce a quantitative analysis metric to interpret CMs' decisions. We find that CMs prioritize the artifacts of transition regions created when concatenating bona fide and spoofed audio. This focus differs from that of CMs trained on fully spoofed audio, which concentrate on the pattern differences between bona fide and spoofed parts. Our further investigation explains the varying nature of CMs' focus while making correct or incorrect predictions. These insights provide a basis for the design of CM models and the creation of datasets. Moreover, this work lays a foundation of interpretability in the field of partial spoofed audio detection that has not been well explored previously.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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