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arXiv 2404.02458eess.SYcs.SYmath.OC
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面向能源共享的网络感知且福利最大化的动态定价

Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing

Ahmed S. Alahmed, Guido Cavraro, Andrey Bernstein, Lang Tong

AI总结:

针对表后分布式能源普及带来的配电网运行挑战,本文提出适配能源共享联盟的网络感知动态定价框架,通过Stackelberg博弈引导产消者安全运行并最大化社会福利,仿真验证了其动态特性与电压调控效果。

摘要:

配电网络中表后(BTM)分布式能源(DER)的普及带来了显著的供需灵活性,但也引发了电压尖峰、反向潮流等运行挑战。针对这一问题,本文提出了一种适配能源共享联盟的网络感知动态定价框架,该联盟聚合了配电系统运营商(DSO)营收电表下游、规模小但分布广泛的BTM DER,且采用通用净电能计量(NEM)电价。通过构建能源共享市场领导者与其产消者之间的Stackelberg博弈,本文证明该动态定价策略可引导产消者实现网络安全运行,并以分布式方式最大化能源共享社会福利。该动态定价机制结合了位置型事前动态价格与事后分摊,二者均为能源共享BTM DER的函数,其中事后分摊与DSO NEM电价和能源共享节点电价的差价成正比。基于真实DER数据与IEEE 13节点测试系统的仿真结果,验证了各节点网络感知定价的动态特性及其对电压的影响。

英文摘要:

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energy-sharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy-sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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