最大化分片区块链分类账中的交易定价
Transaction Pricing for Maximizing Throughput in a Sharded Blockchain Ledger
摘要：
在本文中，我们提出了一种定价机制，该机制将在去中心化分类账上交换资源的代理的激励与最大化交易吞吐量的目标相结合。将区块链分类账细分为碎片有望大大提高交易吞吐量，同时将安全性损失降至最低。然而，交易的组织和类型也会影响账本的效率，钱包代理尽可能在单个分片中进行交易，同时在可用的分片中统一分布他们的交易，从而提高了账本的效率。由于没有中央权威机构来强制执行这些属性，实现这些属性的唯一方法是设计系统，以便代理人以有利于整体吞吐量的方式行事。我们表明，我们提出的定价政策正是通过诱导代理人的潜在博弈来实现这一点，其中潜在函数与账本吞吐量直接相关。仿真结果表明，这种政策导致接近最佳的吞吐量在各种条件下。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we present a pricing mechanism that aligns incentives of agents who exchange resources on a decentralized ledger with the goal of maximizing transaction throughput. Subdividing a blockchain ledger into shards promises to greatly increase transaction throughput with minimal loss of security. However, the organization and type of the transactions also affects the ledger's efficiency, which is increased by wallet agents transacting in a single shard whenever possible while collectively distributing their transactions uniformly across the available shards. Since there is no central authority to enforce these properties, the only means of achieving them is to design the system such that it is in agents' interest to act in a way that benefits overall throughput. We show that our proposed pricing policy does exactly this by inducing a potential game for the agents, where the potential function relates directly to ledger throughput. Simulations demonstrate that this policy leads to near-optimal throughput under a variety of conditions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
