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arXiv 2403.07177econ.TH
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无共谋的共谋结果

Collusive Outcomes Without Collusion

Inkoo Cho, Noah Williams

AI总结:

本研究构建阻断所有显隐性共谋渠道却仍能产生共谋结果的算法定价模型,分析双寡头市场下企业参数化定价算法的内生适应动态,用大偏差理论解释周期性共谋定价现象,为竞争政策带来挑战。

摘要:

我们构建了一个算法定价模型,该模型阻断了所有显性或隐性共谋的渠道,但仍能产生共谋结果。我们分析了双寡头市场的动态,其中两家企业均使用由参数化模型规格族构成的定价算法。企业会同时更新参数和模型权重,以内生适应市场结果。我们表明,市场会出现两家企业将价格设定在共谋水平的周期性阶段。我们对模型的动态进行了解析刻画,利用大偏差理论解释了共谋结果的周期性阶段。我们的结果表明,在具有互补性和内生适应性的算法环境中,共谋结果可能是一种周期性特征,这对竞争政策构成了挑战。

英文摘要:

We develop a model of algorithmic pricing that shuts down every channel for explicit or implicit collusion while still generating collusive outcomes. We analyze the dynamics of a duopoly market where both firms use pricing algorithms consisting of a parameterized family of model specifications. The firms update both the parameters and the weights on models to adapt endogenously to market outcomes. We show that the market experiences recurrent episodes where both firms set prices at collusive levels. We analytically characterize the dynamics of the model, using large deviation theory to explain the recurrent episodes of collusive outcomes. Our results show that collusive outcomes may be a recurrent feature of algorithmic environments with complementarities and endogenous adaptation, providing a challenge for competition policy.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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