In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to ideally obtain a positive classification from the learner's classifier. The typical response of the learner is to carefully modify their classifier to be robust to such strategic behavior. When reasoning about agent manipulations, most papers that study strategic classification rely on the following strong assumption: agents fully know the exact parameters of the deployed classifier by the learner. This often is an unrealistic assumption when using complex or proprietary machine learning techniques in real-world prediction tasks.
We initiate the study of partial information release by the learner in strategic classification. We move away from the traditional assumption that agents have full knowledge of the classifier. Instead, we consider agents that have a common distributional prior on which classifier the learner is using. The learner in our model can reveal truthful, yet not necessarily complete, information about the deployed classifier to the agents. The learner's goal is to release just enough information about the classifier to maximize accuracy. We show how such partial information release can, counter-intuitively, benefit the learner's accuracy, despite increasing agents' abilities to manipulate.
We show that while it is intractable to compute the best response of an agent in the general case, there exist oracle-efficient algorithms that can solve the best response of the agents when the learner's hypothesis class is the class of linear classifiers, or when the agents' cost function satisfies a natural notion of submodularity as we define. We then turn our attention to the learner's optimization problem and provide both positive and negative results on the algorithmic problem of how much information the learner should release about the classifier to maximize their expected accuracy.
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）
Strategic classification regards the problem of learning in settings where users can strategically modify their features to improve outcomes. This setting applies broadly and has received much recent attention. But despite its practical significance, work in this space has so far been predominantly theoretical. In this paper we present a learning framework for strategic classification that is practical. Our approach directly minimizes the "strategic" empirical risk, achieved by differentiating through the strategic response of users. This provides flexibility that allows us to extend beyond th…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the game by deploying a model, and the strategic agents "follow" by playing their best response to the deployed model. Importantly, in this framing, the burden of learning is placed solely on the decision-maker, while the agents' best responses are implicitly treated as instantaneous. In this work, we argue that the order of play in strategic classification is fu…
Non-Linear Strategic Classification Made Practical
School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh（爱丁堡大学信息学院）；Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford（牛津大学工程科学系）；School of Informatics University of Edinburgh（爱丁堡大学信息学院）
This paper proposes a methodology to estimate uncertainty in automated vehicle (AV) dynamics in real time via Bayesian inference. Based on the estimated uncertainty, the method aims to continuously monitor the car-following (CF) performance of the AV to support strategic actions to maintain a desired performance. Our methodology consists of three sequential components: (i) the Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD) is adopted to estimate parameter uncertainty relative to vehicular dynamics in real time, (ii) dynamic monitoring of car-following stability (local and string-wise), and (iii)…
Strategic classification studies the interaction between a classification rule and the strategic agents it governs. Under the assumption that the classifier is known, rational agents respond to it by manipulating their features. However, in many real-life scenarios of high-stake classification (e.g., credit scoring), the classifier is not revealed to the agents, which leads agents to attempt to learn the classifier and game it too. In this paper we generalize the strategic classification model to such scenarios. We define the price of opacity as the difference in prediction error between opaqu…
Breaking the Gradient Barrier: Unveiling Large Language Models for Strategic Classification
College of Computer Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology（国防科技大学计算机科学与技术学院）；Center for Data Science, Peking University（北京大学数据科学中心）；Faculty of Engineering, the University of Sydney（悉尼大学工程学院）；Faculty of Computing, Harbin Institute of Technology（哈尔滨工业大学计算机学院）
Duke University（杜克大学）；University of Southern California（南加州大学）
Machine learning techniques can be useful in applications such as credit approval and college admission. However, to be classified more favorably in such contexts, an agent may decide to strategically withhold some of her features, such as bad test scores. This is a missing data problem with a twist: which data is missing {\em depends on the chosen classifier}, because the specific classifier is what may create the incentive to withhold certain feature values. We address the problem of training classifiers that are robust to this behavior. We design three classification methods: {\sc Mincut}, …
University of Waterloo（滑铁卢大学）；York University（约克大学）
Strategic classification, i.e. classification under possible strategic manipulations of features, has received a lot of attention from both the machine learning and the game theory community. Most works focus on analysing properties of the optimal decision rule under such manipulations. In our work we take a learning theoretic perspective, focusing on the sample complexity needed to learn a good decision rule which is robust to strategic manipulation. We perform this analysis by introducing a novel loss function, the \emph{strategic manipulation loss}, which takes into account both the accurac…
We study an online linear classification problem, in which the data is generated by strategic agents who manipulate their features in an effort to change the classification outcome. In rounds, the learner deploys a classifier, and an adversarially chosen agent arrives, possibly manipulating her features to optimally respond to the learner. The learner has no knowledge of the agents' utility functions or "real" features, which may vary widely across agents. Instead, the learner is only able to observe their "revealed preferences" --- i.e. the actual manipulated feature vectors they provide. For…
Consequential decision-making typically incentivizes individuals to behave strategically, tailoring their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. A long line of work has therefore sought to counteract strategic behavior by designing more conservative decision boundaries in an effort to increase robustness to the effects of strategic covariate shift. We show that these efforts benefit the institutional decision maker at the expense of the individuals being classified. Introducing a notion of social burden, we prove that any increase in institutional utility necessarily leads to a corres…
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）
Strategic classification studies learning in settings where self-interested users can strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. A key working assumption, however, is that "favorable" always means "positive"; this may be appropriate in some applications (e.g., loan approval), but reduces to a fairly narrow view of what user interests can be. In this work we argue for a broader perspective on what accounts for strategic user behavior, and propose and study a flexible model of generalized strategic classification. Our generalized model subsumes most current mode…
Faculty of Computer Science, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院计算机科学学院）；Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben Gurion University（本古里安大学工业工程与管理系）
Khoury College of Computer Science, Northeastern University（东北大学库利计算机学院）；University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学）；Biocomplexity Institute and Initiative, University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学生物复杂性研究所）
The study of strategic or adversarial manipulation of testing data to fool a classifier has attracted much recent attention. Most previous works have focused on two extreme situations where any testing data point either is completely adversarial or always equally prefers the positive label. In this paper, we generalize both of these through a unified framework for strategic classification, and introduce the notion of strategic VC-dimension (SVC) to capture the PAC-learnability in our general strategic setup. SVC provably generalizes the recent concept of adversarial VC-dimension (AVC) introduc…
Consequential decision-making incentivizes individuals to strategically adapt their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. While a long line of work has viewed strategic adaptation as gaming and attempted to mitigate its effects, recent work has instead sought to design classifiers that incentivize individuals to improve a desired quality. Key to both accounts is a cost function that dictates which adaptations are rational to undertake. In this work, we develop a causal framework for strategic adaptation. Our causal perspective clearly distinguishes between gaming and improvement and …
Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago（芝加哥丰田技术研究所）；Carnegie Mellon University（卡内基梅隆大学）；Northwestern University（西北大学）
In this work, we consider classification of agents who can both game and improve. For example, people wishing to get a loan may be able to take some actions that increase their perceived credit-worthiness and others that also increase their true credit-worthiness. A decision-maker would like to define a classification rule with few false-positives (does not give out many bad loans) while yielding many true positives (giving out many good loans), which includes encouraging agents to improve to become true positives if possible. We consider two models for this problem, a general discrete model a…
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision su…
We study the problem of allocating $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ homogeneous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a pre-specified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total valuation of items allocated to them. The agents' valuations for the item in each round are assumed to be i.i.d. but their distribution is a priori unknown to the central planner. Therefore, the central planner needs to implicitly learn these distributions from the observed values in order to pick a good allocation policy. However, an added challenge here is tha…
Machine learning relies on the assumption that unseen test instances of a classification problem follow the same distribution as observed training data. However, this principle can break down when machine learning is used to make important decisions about the welfare (employment, education, health) of strategic individuals. Knowing information about the classifier, such individuals may manipulate their attributes in order to obtain a better classification outcome. As a result of this behavior---often referred to as gaming---the performance of the classifier may deteriorate sharply. Indeed, gam…
When reasoning about strategic behavior in a machine learning context it is tempting to combine standard microfoundations of rational agents with the statistical decision theory underlying classification. In this work, we argue that a direct combination of these standard ingredients leads to brittle solution concepts of limited descriptive and prescriptive value. First, we show that rational agents with perfect information produce discontinuities in the aggregate response to a decision rule that we often do not observe empirically. Second, when any positive fraction of agents is not perfectly …
The Role of Causal Features in Strategic Classification for Robustness and Alignment
Mila & Université de Montréal（Mila与蒙特利尔大学）；Canada CIFAR AI Chair（加拿大CIFAR人工智能主席）；Faculty of Computer Science, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology（技术学院-以色列理工学院计算机科学系）；Dept. of Computing Science, Amii & University of Alberta, Canada（计算科学系，Amii与阿尔伯塔大学，加拿大）
Beyond Independent Manipulation: Individual Fairness-aware Strategic Classification with Peer Imitation
College of Computer Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology（国防科技大学计算机科学与技术学院）；School of Mathematical Sciences, Peking University（北京大学数学学院）；Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics（上海财经大学理论计算机科学研究所）；Information Technology Development, Aetos Capital Group, Sydney（悉尼Aetos资本集团信息技术部）；Faculty of Computing, Harbin Institute of Technology（哈尔滨工业大学计算机学院）；Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University（清华大学计算机科学与技术系）
Washington University in Saint Louis（圣路易斯华盛顿大学）；George Mason University（乔治梅森大学）；University of California Santa Cruz（加州大学圣克鲁兹分校）
The use of algorithmic decision making systems in domains which impact the financial, social, and political well-being of people has created a demand for these decision making systems to be "fair" under some accepted notion of equity. This demand has in turn inspired a large body of work focused on the development of fair learning algorithms which are then used in lieu of their conventional counterparts. Most analysis of such fair algorithms proceeds from the assumption that the people affected by the algorithmic decisions are represented as immutable feature vectors. However, strategic agents…
We investigate the problem of designing optimal classifiers in the strategic classification setting, where the classification is part of a game in which players can modify their features to attain a favorable classification outcome (while incurring some cost). Previously, the problem has been considered from a learning-theoretic perspective and from the algorithmic fairness perspective. Our main contributions include 1. Showing that if the objective is to maximize the efficiency of the classification process (defined as the accuracy of the outcome minus the sunk cost of the qualified players m…
When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the interaction between a learner and agents in a world where all agents are equally able to manipulate their features in an attempt to "trick" a published classifier. In cases of real world classification, however, an agent's ability to adapt to an algorithm is not simply a function of her personal interest in receiving a positive classification, but is bound up in a…
In Bayesian classification, it is important to establish a probabilistic model for each class for likelihood estimation. Most of the previous methods modeled the probability distribution in the whole sample space. However, real-world problems are usually too complex to model in the whole sample space; some fundamental assumptions are required to simplify the global model, for example, the class conditional independence assumption for naive Bayesian classification. In this paper, with the insight that the distribution in a local sample space should be simpler than that in the whole sample space…
