Federated learning (FL) is increasingly recognized for its efficacy in training models using locally distributed data. However, the proper valuation of shared data in this collaborative process remains insufficiently addressed. In this work, we frame FL as a marketplace of models, where clients act as both buyers and sellers, engaging in model trading. This FL market allows clients to gain monetary reward by selling their own models and improve local model performance through the purchase of others' models. We propose an auction-based solution to ensure proper pricing based on performance gain. Incentive mechanisms are designed to encourage clients to truthfully reveal their model valuations. Furthermore, we introduce a reinforcement learning (RL) framework for marketing operations, aiming to achieve maximum trading volumes under the dynamic and evolving market status. Experimental results on four datasets demonstrate that the proposed FL market can achieve high trading revenue and fair downstream task accuracy.
We establish a general optimization framework for the design of automated bidding agent in dynamic online marketplaces. It optimizes solely for the buyer's interest and is agnostic to the auction mechanism imposed by the seller. As a result, the framework allows, for instance, the joint optimization of a group of ads across multiple platforms each running its own auction format. Bidding strategy derived from this framework automatically guarantees the optimality of budget allocation across ad units and platforms. Common constraints such as budget delivery schedule, return on investments and gu…
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem（耶路撒冷希伯来大学）；Microsoft Research（微软研究院）
We consider the problem of bid prediction in repeated auctions and evaluate the performance of econometric methods for learning agents using a dataset from a mainstream sponsored search auction marketplace. Sponsored search auctions is a billion dollar industry and the main source of revenue of several tech giants. A critical problem in optimizing such marketplaces is understanding how bidders will react to changes in the auction design. We propose the use of no-regret based econometrics for bid prediction, modeling players as no-regret learners with respect to a utility function, unknown to t…
D2M: A Decentralized, Privacy-Preserving, Incentive-Compatible Data Marketplace for Collaborative Learning
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Jodhpur（计算机科学与工程系，印度理工学院，乔浦尔）；School of Mathematics and Computational Sciences, Eastern University Pennsylvania（数学与计算科学学院，东部大学宾夕法尼亚）
We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a marketplace typically charges fees for facilitating trade. The goal of this work is to design a dynamic fee schedule for the marketplace that is equitable and profitable to all traders while being profitable to the marketplace at the same time (from charging fees). Since the traders adapt their strategies to the fee schedule, we present a reinforcement learni…
As Machine Learning (ML) models are becoming increasingly complex, one of the central challenges is their deployment at scale, such that companies and organizations can create value through Artificial Intelligence (AI). An emerging paradigm in ML is a federated approach where the learning model is delivered to a group of heterogeneous agents partially, allowing agents to train the model locally with their own data. However, the problem of valuation of models, as well the questions of incentives for collaborative training and trading of data/models, have received limited treatment in the litera…
Learn then Decide: A Learning Approach for Designing Data Marketplaces
Department of Statistics and Data Science, University of California, Los Angeles（加州大学洛杉矶分校统计与数据科学系）；Department of Biostatistics, University of California, Los Angeles（加州大学洛杉矶分校生物统计系）；Department of Biostatistics, University of Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚大学生物统计系）
In the last three decades, we have seen a significant increase in trading goods and services through online auctions. However, this business created an attractive environment for malicious moneymakers who can commit different types of fraud activities, such as Shill Bidding (SB). The latter is predominant across many auctions but this type of fraud is difficult to detect due to its similarity to normal bidding behaviour. The unavailability of SB datasets makes the development of SB detection and classification models burdensome. Furthermore, to implement efficient SB detection models, we shoul…
Brown University（布朗大学）；University of Washington（华盛顿大学）
In this paper, we describe our autonomous bidding agent, RoxyBot, who emerged victorious in the travel division of the 2006 Trading Agent Competition in a photo finish. At a high level, the design of many successful trading agents can be summarized as follows: (i) price prediction: build a model of market prices; and (ii) optimization: solve for an approximately optimal set of bids, given this model. To predict, RoxyBot builds a stochastic model of market prices by simulating simultaneous ascending auctions. To optimize, RoxyBot relies on the sample average approximation method, a stochastic o…
