arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2402.00394econ.THcs.GTmath.CO
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随机划分、势、值和外溢效应

Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities

André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki, Frank Huettner

AI总结:

本文研究具有外溢效应的博弈中可由随机划分期望累积价值计算的势函数,证明与MPW解对应的势是唯一的,它推广了无外溢情形并满足零参与者性质。

摘要:

Shapley值等于一个博弈中某个参与者对势的贡献。势是一个博弈最自然的一位数概括,可以计算为参与者随机划分的期望累积价值。这种计算整合了所有参与者的联盟形成过程,并且可以自然地扩展到具有外溢效应的博弈。我们研究了那些可以以这种方式计算的、具有外溢效应的博弈的势函数。结果表明,与Macho-Stadler等人(2007年,《经济理论杂志》135卷,339-356页)提出的MPW解相对应的势在以下意义上是唯一的:它作为随机划分的期望累积价值获得,推广了无外溢效应博弈的势,并且它导出了一个即使在外溢效应存在的情况下也满足零参与者性质的解。

英文摘要:

The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This computation integrates the coalition formation of all players and readily extends to games with externalities. We investigate those potential functions for games with externalities that can be computed this way. It turns out that the potential that corresponds to the MPW solution introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339--356) is unique in the following sense. It is obtained as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition, it generalizes the potential for games without externalities, and it induces a solution that satisfies the null player property even in the presence of externalities.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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