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arXiv 2401.17618cs.CRcs.OS
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超越控制:探索用于 Linux 系统纯数据攻击的新型文件系统对象

Beyond Control: Exploring Novel File System Objects for Data-Only Attacks on Linux Systems

Jinmeng Zhou, Jiayi Hu, Ziyue Pan, Jiaxun Zhu, Wenbo Shen, Guoren Li, Zhiyun Qian

AI总结:

本文研究 Linux 内核文件子系统中的非控制数据攻击,提出静态与动态结合的半自动分析测试框架,发现并分类新型可利用文件系统对象,且通过 18 个 CVE 和 10 个端到端利用验证其有效性。

摘要:

控制流完整性的广泛部署推动非控制数据攻击成为主流。在操作系统内核漏洞利用领域,通过破坏关键的非控制数据,本地攻击者无需劫持控制流即可直接获得 root 访问权限或实现权限提升。因此,操作系统内核一直在限制此类非控制数据的可用性。这迫使攻击者继续在内核中寻找更具可利用性的非控制数据。然而,发现未知的非控制数据可能十分困难,因为它们通常与语义紧密相关,且缺乏通用模式。本文作出两项贡献:(1)发现文件子系统中的关键非控制对象;(2)分析其可利用性。本工作是首个以最少领域知识,在 Linux 内核文件子系统中半自动发现并评估可利用非控制数据的研究。我们的方案使用定制分析与测试框架,从静态和动态两方面识别有潜力的候选对象。此外,我们将这些发现的对象划分为适合多种漏洞利用策略的类型,其中包括一种新型策略,该策略对于克服隔离许多此类对象的防御机制是必要的。这些对象的优势在于无需 KASLR 即可利用,从而使漏洞利用更简单、更可靠。我们使用 18 个真实 CVE,通过多种漏洞利用策略评估文件系统对象的可利用性。我们利用部分 CVE,针对启用了所有最先进缓解措施的内核开发了 10 个端到端漏洞利用。

英文摘要:

The widespread deployment of control-flow integrity has propelled non-control data attacks into the mainstream. In the domain of OS kernel exploits, by corrupting critical non-control data, local attackers can directly gain root access or privilege escalation without hijacking the control flow. As a result, OS kernels have been restricting the availability of such non-control data. This forces attackers to continue to search for more exploitable non-control data in OS kernels. However, discovering unknown non-control data can be daunting because they are often tied heavily to semantics and lack universal patterns. We make two contributions in this paper: (1) discover critical non-control objects in the file subsystem and (2) analyze their exploitability. This work represents the first study, with minimal domain knowledge, to semi-automatically discover and evaluate exploitable non-control data within the file subsystem of the Linux kernel. Our solution utilizes a custom analysis and testing framework that statically and dynamically identifies promising candidate objects. Furthermore, we categorize these discovered objects into types that are suitable for various exploit strategies, including a novel strategy necessary to overcome the defense that isolates many of these objects. These objects have the advantage of being exploitable without requiring KASLR, thus making the exploits simpler and more reliable. We use 18 real-world CVEs to evaluate the exploitability of the file system objects using various exploit strategies. We develop 10 end-to-end exploits using a subset of CVEs against the kernel with all state-of-the-art mitigations enabled.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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