Shufflecake：Linux 上多个隐藏文件系统的合理否认性
Shufflecake: Plausible Deniability for Multiple Hidden Filesystems on Linux
AI总结：
Shufflecake 是一种新的合理否认性设计，原生支持 Linux 并能管理多个隐藏文件系统卷，性能优于 ORAM 方案，为面临威胁的记者和活动家提供数据隐藏工具。
摘要：
我们提出了 Shufflecake，这是一种新的合理否认性设计，用于隐藏存储介质上加密数据的存在，使得对手极难证明此类数据的存在。Shufflecake 可被视为 TrueCrypt 和 VeraCrypt 等工具的“精神继承者”，但有了极大的改进：它原生在 Linux 上运行，支持任意选择的文件系统，并且可以管理每个设备的多个卷，从而使隐藏分区的存在具有真正的合理否认性。与基于 ORAM 的解决方案相比，Shufflecake 速度极快且更简单，但不提供针对多快照对手的原生保护。然而，我们讨论了由其架构实现的安全扩展，并展示了证据说明为何这些扩展可能足以抵御更强大的对手。我们将 Shufflecake 实现为 Linux 的内核工具，添加了有用的功能，并对其性能进行了基准测试，结果显示与基础加密系统相比仅有轻微的减速。我们相信，对于言论自由受到压制性当局或危险犯罪组织威胁的人，特别是举报人、调查记者和压迫政权下的人权活动家，Shufflecake 是一款有用的工具。
英文摘要：
We present Shufflecake, a new plausible deniability design to hide the existence of encrypted data on a storage medium making it very difficult for an adversary to prove the existence of such data. Shufflecake can be considered a ``spiritual successor'' of tools such as TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt, but vastly improved: it works natively on Linux, it supports any filesystem of choice, and can manage multiple volumes per device, so to make deniability of the existence of hidden partitions really plausible. Compared to ORAM-based solutions, Shufflecake is extremely fast and simpler but does not offer native protection against multi-snapshot adversaries. However, we discuss security extensions that are made possible by its architecture, and we show evidence why these extensions might be enough to thwart more powerful adversaries. We implemented Shufflecake as an in-kernel tool for Linux, adding useful features, and we benchmarked its performance showing only a minor slowdown compared to a base encrypted system. We believe Shufflecake represents a useful tool for people whose freedom of expression is threatened by repressive authorities or dangerous criminal organizations, in particular: whistleblowers, investigative journalists, and activists for human rights in oppressive regimes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
