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arXiv 2312.09119cs.GTcs.DS
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在线联盟形成中的稳定性

Stability in Online Coalition Formation

Martin Bullinger, René Romen

AI总结:

本文研究在线联盟形成问题,在可加可分快乐博弈中刻画了基于个体和群体偏离的稳定性概念的算法可行性边界,给出确定性与随机化算法的二分结果。

摘要:

联盟形成关注的是如何根据智能体的偏好将一组智能体划分为互不相交的联盟。与大多数先前工作不同,我们考虑该问题的在线变体,其中智能体按顺序到达。每当一个智能体到达时,必须立即且不可撤销地将其分配到一个联盟中。现有关于在线联盟形成的稀缺文献主要关注最大化社会福利,这一要求即使在离线环境中也很苛刻。相反,我们寻求在线实现稳定的联盟结构,并处理基于单个智能体和智能体群体偏离的最常见稳定性概念。我们在可加可分快乐博弈中呈现了一幅全面的图景,得到了二分结果,其中正结果由确定性算法获得,而负结果甚至对随机化算法也成立。

英文摘要:

Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where agents arrive in sequence. Whenever an agent arrives, they must be assigned to a coalition immediately and irrevocably. The scarce existing literature on online coalition formation has focused on maximizing social welfare, a demanding requirement, even in the offline setting. Instead, we seek to achieve \emph{stable} coalition structures online and treat the most common stability concepts based on deviations by single agents and groups of agents. We present a comprehensive picture in additively separable hedonic games, leading to dichotomies, where positive results are obtained by deterministic algorithms and negative results even hold for randomized algorithms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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