We observe some puzzling linguistic data concerning ordinary knowledge ascriptions that embed an epistemic (im)possibility claim. We conclude that it is untenable to jointly endorse both classical logic and a pair of intuitively attractive theses: the thesis that knowledge ascriptions are always veridical and a `negative transparency' thesis that reduces knowledge of a simple negated `might' claim to an epistemic claim without modal content. We motivate a strategy for answering the trade-off: preserve veridicality and (generalized) negative transparency, while abandoning the general validity of contraposition. We survey and criticize various approaches for incorporating veridicality into domain semantics, a paradigmatic `information-sensitive' framework for capturing negative transparency and, more generally, the non-classical behavior of sentences with epistemic modals. We then present a novel information-sensitive semantics that successfully executes our favored strategy: stable acceptance semantics.
本文利用一种新的范畴语义学--基变语义学来研究模态类型论。基变语义是一种新颖的语义,它是基于(可能是无限的)迭代丰富和解释的模态作为homobject。在我们的语义中,多阶段计算中的Meta和对象级别之间的关系正好对应于丰富和丰富类别之间的关系。其结果是,我们获得了Meta和对象逻辑可能完全不同的情况下的分类解释。我们的分类模型包括模态类型论的传统模型(例如,Carnival闭范畴与monoidal endofunctor)作为特殊情况,因此可以看作是一个自然的改进以前的结果。在类型理论方面,它表明,菲奇风格的模态类型论可以直接解释在迭代丰富的类别。有趣的是,这种解释表明,Fitch风格的模态类型论是双上下文演算的右伴随。此外,我们提出了如何线性时间,S4和线性指数形式的变化的基础语义方面的描述。最后,我们表明,基的变化语义可以自然地扩展到多阶段的有效计算和广义上下文模态一la Nanevski et al.我们强调,本文回答了在2011年的调查报告中提出的问题,由德派瓦和Ritter,什么是一个分类模型的Fitch风格的类型论是什么样的。