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arXiv 2305.09002eess.SYcs.SY
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网络系统中完全去中心化学习的均衡

Equilibria of Fully Decentralized Learning in Networked Systems

Yan Jiang, Wenqi Cui, Baosen Zhang, Jorge Cortés

AI总结:

本文针对完全去中心化学习,提出一种易于检查的线性系统结构,证明纯策略纳什均衡存在性并推测唯一性,设计投影梯度下降机制,5人博弈模拟验证结果。

摘要:

现有的去中心化学习设置要么要求参与者拥有完全信息,要么要求系统具有某种特殊结构,这种结构可能难以检查,并阻碍其在实际系统中的适用性。为了克服这一点,我们识别出一种对于线性动态系统而言易于检查的结构,其中每个参与者以完全去中心化的方式学习以最小化其成本。我们首先建立了由此产生的非合作博弈中纯策略纳什均衡的存在性。然后我们推测,如果系统满足其结构上的额外要求,纳什均衡是唯一的。我们还引入了一种基于投影梯度下降的去中心化机制,使智能体能够学习纳什均衡。在一个5人博弈上的模拟验证了我们的结果。

英文摘要:

Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we identify a structure that is simple to check for linear dynamical system, where each player learns in a fully decentralized fashion to minimize its cost. We first establish the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the resulting noncooperative game. We then conjecture that the Nash equilibrium is unique provided that the system satisfies an additional requirement on its structure. We also introduce a decentralized mechanism based on projected gradient descent to have agents learn the Nash equilibrium. Simulations on a $5$-player game validate our results.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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