协商转移定价下的专用性投资:不同盈余分享参数对管理绩效的影响:基于模糊Q学习代理的代理模拟
Specific investments under negotiated transfer pricing: effects of different surplus sharing parameters on managerial performance: An agent-based simulation with fuzzy Q-learning agents
摘要:
本文研究了一个分散的利润中心企业,它使用协商转移定价作为协调生产过程的工具。此外,公司的总部赋予各部门经营决策的全部权力,并假定每个部门都可以额外做出提高内部贸易价值的前期投资决策。在早期的作品中,本文扩大了一个下游部门的部门数量,并放宽了基本假设,如合理性的共同知识的假设。基于代理的模拟,它是研究是否认知有限的个人建模的模糊Q-学习达到完全合理的效用最大化相同的结果。此外,本文研究了不同的星座的谈判能力,看看是否偏离建议的最佳谈判能力导致更高的管理绩效。仿真结果表明,模糊Q-学习代理执行至少以及或优于完全个人的理性效用最大化。该研究还表明,在各部门边际成本不同的情况下,偏离建议的各部门议价能力最佳分配比率,可导致更高的投资水平,从而增加总部的利润。
英文摘要:
This paper focuses on a decentralized profit-center firm that uses negotiated transfer pricing as an instrument to coordinate the production process. Moreover, the firm's headquarters gives its divisions full authority over operating decisions and it is assumed that each division can additionally make an upfront investment decision that enhances the value of internal trade. On early works, the paper expands the number of divisions by one downstream division and relaxes basic assumptions, such as the assumption of common knowledge of rationality. Based on an agent-based simulation, it is examined whether cognitively bounded individuals modeled by fuzzy Q-learning achieve the same results as fully rational utility maximizers. In addition, the paper investigates different constellations of bargaining power to see whether a deviation from the recommended optimal bargaining power leads to a higher managerial performance. The simulation results show that fuzzy Q-learning agents perform at least as well or better than fully individual rational utility maximizers. The study also indicates that, in scenarios with different marginal costs of divisions, a deviation from the recommended optimal distribution ratio of the bargaining power of divisions can lead to higher investment levels and, thus, to an increase in the headquarters' profit.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。