协商转移定价下盈余分享对特定投资结果的影响:基于模糊Q学习代理的代理模拟
The impact of surplus sharing on the outcomes of specific investments under negotiated transfer pricing: An agent-based simulation with fuzzy Q-learning agents
摘要:
本文主要研究协议转让定价下的特定投资。研究转移定价的原因主要是为了找到最大化公司整体利润的条件,特别是在特定投资的双边贸易问题的情况下。然而,转移定价问题是在管理者完全是个体理性效用最大化者的背景下发展起来的。基本假设是相当大胆的,特别是管理者如何在不确定性下处理信息,与人类的决策行为并不完全匹配。因此,本文放宽关键假设和研究是否认知有限的代理实现完全理性的效用最大化,特别是,是否管理层的补偿安排和谈判基础设施的建议,旨在最大限度地提高总部的利润在这样一个设置相同的结果。基于代理的模拟与模糊Q-学习代理,它表明,在对称的边际成本参数的情况下,近视模糊Q-学习代理的投资只有一样多,在经典的滞留问题,而非近视模糊Q-学习代理投资最优。然而,在非对称边际成本参数的情况下,偏离先前建议的盈余分享规则可能会导致更高的投资决策,从而增加公司的整体利润。
英文摘要:
This paper focuses on specific investments under negotiated transfer pricing. Reasons for transfer pricing studies are primarily to find conditions that maximize the firm's overall profit, especially in cases with bilateral trading problems with specific investments. However, the transfer pricing problem has been developed in the context where managers are fully individual rational utility maximizers. The underlying assumptions are rather heroic and, in particular, how managers process information under uncertainty, do not perfectly match with human decision-making behavior. Therefore, this paper relaxes key assumptions and studies whether cognitively bounded agents achieve the same results as fully rational utility maximizers and, in particular, whether the recommendations on managerial-compensation arrangements and bargaining infrastructures are designed to maximize headquarters' profit in such a setting. Based on an agent-based simulation with fuzzy Q-learning agents, it is shown that in case of symmetric marginal cost parameters, myopic fuzzy Q-learning agents invest only as much as in the classic hold-up problem, while non-myopic fuzzy Q-learning agents invest optimally. However, in scenarios with non-symmetric marginal cost parameters, a deviation from the previously recommended surplus sharing rules can lead to higher investment decisions and, thus, to an increase in the firm's overall profit.
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