连通交易环
Connected Trading Cycles
AI总结：
针对住房市场等单边匹配中邀请激励与传统稳定性、最优性不可兼得的问题，本文提出弱化的稳定性和最优性概念，设计连通交易环等机制，首次实现激励相容性下的最佳稳定性与最优性。
摘要：
近期，激励现有参与者邀请新参与者加入拍卖、匹配或合作博弈的问题已得到广泛研究。在这些博弈中设计此类激励的一个常见挑战是，被邀请者与邀请者是竞争对手。为实现这种激励，我们通常不得不牺牲一些传统属性。特别是在住房市场（一种单边匹配）中，我们无法维持传统的稳定性和最优性。先前的研究提出了一些新的匹配机制以实现邀请激励（激励相容性的一部分），但未对稳定性和最优性提供任何保证。本文提出了可通过激励相容性实现的稳定性和最优性新概念。我们在网络的特殊结构（完整组件）上弱化了稳定性和最优性。首先，我们证明这些弱化概念是激励相容性下能达到的最佳状态。然后，我们提出三种机制（邻居交换、离开与分享、连通交易环）以满足所需属性。连通交易环是首个满足与激励相容性兼容的最佳稳定性和最优性的机制。
英文摘要：
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees and inviters are competitors. To have such an incentive, we normally have to sacrifice some of the traditional properties. Especially, in a housing market (one kind of one-sided matching), we cannot maintain the traditional stability and optimality. The previous studies proposed some new matching mechanisms to have the invitation incentive (part of the incentive compatibility), but did not have any guarantee on stability and optimality. In this paper, we propose new notions of stability and optimality which are achievable with incentive compatibility. We weaken stability and optimality on a special structure (complete components) on networks. We first prove that the weakened notions are the best we can achieve with incentive compatibility. Then, we propose three mechanisms (Swap With Neighbors, Leave and Share, and Connected Trading Cycles) to satisfy the desirable properties. Connected Trading Cycles is the first mechanism to satisfy the best stability and optimality compatible with incentive compatibility.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
