预防-校正网络防御：攻击诱导区域最小化与网络安全裕度最大化
Preventive-Corrective Cyber-Defense: Attack-Induced Region Minimization and Cybersecurity Margin Maximization
AI总结：
本文提出预防-校正网络防御策略，通过预防性分配资源最小化FDI攻击诱导区域，并校正性最大化网络安全裕度，在IEEE 14节点系统上验证了其有效性与成本效益。
摘要：
针对电力系统的虚假数据注入（FDI）网络攻击，可以通过策略性地选择并保护足够大的测量子集来预防，然而这需要充足的网络防御资源用于测量保护。在给定任何网络防御资源的情况下，本文提出了一种预防-校正网络防御策略，该策略以预防方式最小化FDI攻击诱导区域，随后以校正方式最大化网络安全裕度。首先，本文提出一种预防性网络防御策略，通过预防性地分配任何给定的测量保护资源来最小化FDI攻击诱导区域的体积。特别地，提出了构建FDI不可攻击线路的充分条件，表明FDI网络攻击可以被局部而非全局地预防。然后，在存在非空FDI攻击诱导区域的情况下，本文提出一种校正性网络防御策略，该策略最大化网络安全裕度，从而在最安全但昂贵的运行点（即欧几里得切比雪夫中心）与最便宜但危险的运行点之间进行权衡。在改进的IEEE 14节点系统上的仿真结果验证了所提出的预防-校正网络防御策略的有效性和成本效益。
英文摘要：
False data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on power systems can be prevented by strategically selecting and protecting a sufficiently large measurement subset, which, however, requires adequate cyber-defense resources for measurement protection. With any given cyber-defense resource, this paper proposes a preventive-corrective cyber-defense strategy, which minimizes the FDI attack-induced region in a preventive manner, followed by maximizing the cybersecurity margin in a corrective manner. First, this paper proposes a preventive cyber-defense strategy that minimizes the volume of the FDI attack-induced region via preventive allocation of any given measurement protection resource. Particularly, a sufficient condition for constructing the FDI unattackable lines is proposed, indicating that the FDI cyber-attack could be locally rather than globally prevented. Then, given a non-empty FDI attack-induced region, this paper proposes a corrective cyber-defense strategy that maximizes the cybersecurity margin, leading to a trade-off between the safest-but-expensive operation point (i.e., Euclidean Chebyshev center) and the cheapest-but-dangerous operation point. Simulation results on a modified IEEE 14 bus system verify the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the proposed preventive-corrective cyber-defense strategy.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
