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arXiv 2301.05755cs.GT
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弥合单一目标游戏和多目标游戏之间的差距

Bridging the Gap Between Single and Multi Objective Games

Willem Röpke, Carla Groenland, Roxana Rădulescu, Ann Nowé, Diederik M. Roijers

摘要:

研究多智能体系统战略决策的经典模型是规范型博弈。这个模型可以推广到允许无限数量的纯策略导致连续的游戏。多目标正态型博弈是另一种概括,它模拟了玩家在多个目标中获得单独收益的情况。我们通过提供一个理论保证来弥合这两个模型之间的差距,即一个设置的游戏总是可以转换为另一个设置的游戏。我们扩展的理论结果,包括保证等价的纳什均衡。这种映射使得将算法从一个领域应用到另一个领域成为可能。我们通过引入多目标游戏的虚拟游戏算法并随后将其应用于两个著名的连续游戏来证明这一点。我们相信,等价关系将有助于新的见解翻译的理论保证从一个形式主义到另一个。此外,它可能会导致新的计算方法连续游戏时,一个问题是更自然地解决了简洁的格式的多目标游戏。

英文摘要:

A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form games are another generalisation that model settings where players receive separate payoffs in more than one objective. We bridge the gap between the two models by providing a theoretical guarantee that a game from one setting can always be transformed to a game in the other. We extend the theoretical results to include guaranteed equivalence of Nash equilibria. The mapping makes it possible to apply algorithms from one field to the other. We demonstrate this by introducing a fictitious play algorithm for multi-objective games and subsequently applying it to two well-known continuous games. We believe the equivalence relation will lend itself to new insights by translating the theoretical guarantees from one formalism to another. Moreover, it may lead to new computational approaches for continuous games when a problem is more naturally solved in the succinct format of multi-objective games.

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