Decision-making methods very often use the technique of comparing alternatives in pairs. In this approach, experts are asked to compare different options, and then a quantitative ranking is created from the results obtained. It is commonly believed that experts (decision-makers) are honest in their judgments. In our work, we consider a scenario in which experts are vulnerable to bribery. For this purpose, we define a framework that allows us to determine the intended manipulation and present three algorithms for achieving the intended goal. Analyzing these algorithms may provide clues to help defend against such attacks.
Sequential Manipulation Against Rank Aggregation: Theory and Algorithm
School of Electronic, Electrical and Communication Engineering, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院大学电子电气与通信工程学院);Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院计算技术研究所);School of Computer and Information Engineering, Jiangxi Normal University(江西师范大学计算机与信息工程学院);Tencent Data Platform(腾讯数据平台);School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shenzhen Campus of Sun Yat-sen University(中山大学深圳校区网络空间安全学院);School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院大学计算机科学与技术学院)
The Tournament Tree Method for preference elicitation in Multi-criteria decision-making
Department of Mathematics, Universidad de Ja \'e n, 23071 Ja \'e n, Spain;Department of Computer Science, Universidad de Ja \'e n, 23071 Ja \'e n, Spain
A Statistical Framework for Ranking LLM-Based Chatbots
ICSI and Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley(ICSI和统计学系,加州大学伯克利分校);Department of Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley(计算机科学系,加州大学伯克利分校);ICSI, LBNL, and Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley(ICSI、劳伦斯伯克利国家实验室和统计学系,加州大学伯克利分校)