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arXiv 2210.15035econ.TH
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定价和电动汽车充电均衡

Pricing and Electric Vehicle Charging Equilibria

Trivikram Dokka, Jorge Bruno, Sonali SenGupta, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar

摘要:

我们研究电动汽车(EV)充电游戏,成本最小化游戏固有的电动汽车电力需求管理的分散式充电控制策略的均衡。在我们的模型中,每个用户优化其总成本,这是直接的电力成本和间接的不满成本之和。我们发现,考虑到玩家特定价格的独立不满成本,与流行的观点相反,羊群效应只发生在EV吸收较低的情况下。此外,对于线性和逻辑不满意度函数都是如此。我们研究的问题存在的价格剖面,以诱导一个理想的均衡。我们定义了两种类型的均衡,分布和非分布均衡,并表明,在物流不满意,只有非分布均衡是可能的,通过可行地设定价格。在线性情况下,两种均衡都是可能的,但价格歧视是必要的,以诱导分布式均衡。最后,我们表明,在对称EV用户的情况下,调解不能改善后纳什均衡。

英文摘要:

We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of direct power cost and the indirect dissatisfaction cost. We show that, taking player specific price independent dissatisfaction cost in to account, contrary to popular belief, herding only happens at lower EV uptake. Moreover, this is true for both linear and logistic dissatisfaction functions. We study the question of existence of price profiles to induce a desired equilibrium. We define two types of equilibria, distributed and non-distributed equilibria, and show that under logistic dissatisfaction, only non-distributed equilibria are possible by feasibly setting prices. In linear case, both type of equilibria are possible but price discrimination is necessary to induce distributed equilibria. Finally, we show that in the case of symmetric EV users, mediation cannot improve upon Nash equilibria.

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