动态多主体系统的竞争均衡:社会塑造与价格轨迹
Competitive Equilibrium for Dynamic Multi-Agent Systems: Social Shaping and Price Trajectories
摘要:
在本文中,我们考虑动态多智能体系统(MAS)的分散资源分配。MAS在竞争均衡下运行,以确保供需平衡。首先,我们研究了有限视界上的MAS。代理的效用函数被参数化,以纳入个人偏好。我们通过一组效用函数来塑造个人偏好,以保证竞争均衡下的资源价格保持社会可接受,即,价格的上限是可承受性阈值。我们证明这个问题在概念层面是可以解决的。接下来,我们考虑二次MAS和制定相关的社会塑造问题作为一个多智能体线性二次型调节器(LQR)的问题,使我们能够提出明确的效用集,使用二次规划和动态规划。然后,给出了一个数值算法来计算一个紧范围的偏好函数参数,保证社会接受的价格。我们研究了无限视界上的竞争均衡的性质。考虑一般效用函数,我们表明,在可行性假设下,任何竞争性均衡最大化的社会福利。然后,我们证明了在充分小的初始条件下,社会福利最大化解构成零价格的竞争均衡。我们还证明了一般可行的初始条件,存在一个时刻后,最优价格,对应于竞争均衡,成为零。最后,我们特别关注二次MAS,并提出明确的结果。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we consider dynamic multi-agent systems (MAS) for decentralized resource allocation. The MAS operates at a competitive equilibrium to ensure supply and demand are balanced. First, we investigate the MAS over a finite horizon. The utility functions of agents are parameterized to incorporate individual preferences. We shape individual preferences through a set of utility functions to guarantee the resource price at a competitive equilibrium remains socially acceptable, i.e., the price is upper-bounded by an affordability threshold. We show this problem is solvable at the conceptual level. Next, we consider quadratic MAS and formulate the associated social shaping problem as a multi-agent linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problem which enables us to propose explicit utility sets using quadratic programming and dynamic programming. Then, a numerical algorithm is presented for calculating a tight range of the preference function parameters which guarantees a socially accepted price. We investigate the properties of a competitive equilibrium over an infinite horizon. Considering general utility functions, we show that under feasibility assumptions, any competitive equilibrium maximizes the social welfare. Then, we prove that for sufficiently small initial conditions, the social welfare maximization solution constitutes a competitive equilibrium with zero price. We also prove for general feasible initial conditions, there exists a time instant after which the optimal price, corresponding to a competitive equilibrium, becomes zero. Finally, we specifically focus on quadratic MAS and propose explicit results.
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