日前市场中互联网容量减少的经济激励
Economic incentives for capacity reductions on interconnectors in the day-ahead market
摘要：
我们认为，一个区域性的国际电力市场，并调查潜在的经济激励措施，短期内减少现有的互联传输容量的负责传输系统运营商（TSO）。我们表明，如果一个TSO的目标是最大限度地提高国内总福利，它往往有动机减少对邻国的互连能力。与（有限的）文学在这个问题上，重点是通过避免未来的平衡成本的激励措施，我们表明，激励措施可以存在，即使一个忽略平衡，只关注福利收益在一天前的市场本身。我们的分析包括两个部分。在第一部分中，我们开发了一个分析框架，解释了为什么这些激励措施存在。特别是，我们区分两种机制：一种是基于与邻国的价格差异，另一种是基于国内电价。在第二部分中，我们使用北欧电力系统的模型进行数值实验，重点是丹麦TSO。在97%的历史测试小时数中，我们确实观察到了减少容量的经济激励，这为丹麦带来了显着的福利收益，为整个系统带来了福利损失。我们表明，福利收益的潜力在很大程度上取决于TSO的能力，以适应互联能力的短期市场条件。最后，我们探讨了在何种程度上最近推出的欧洲“70%规则”可以减轻能力削减及其福利效应的激励。
英文摘要：
We consider a zonal international power market and investigate potential economic incentives for short-term reductions of transmission capacities on existing interconnectors by the responsible transmission system operators (TSOs). We show that if a TSO aims to maximize domestic total welfare, it often has an incentive to reduce the capacity on the interconnectors to neighboring countries. In contrast with the (limited) literature on this subject, which focuses on incentives through the avoidance of future balancing costs, we show that incentives can exist even if one ignores balancing and focuses solely on welfare gains in the day-ahead market itself. Our analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, we develop an analytical framework that explains why these incentives exist. In particular, we distinguish two mechanisms: one based on price differences with neighboring countries and one based on the domestic electricity price. In the second part, we perform numerical experiments using a model of the Northern-European power system, focusing on the Danish TSO. In 97% of the historical hours tested, we indeed observe economic incentives for capacity reductions, leading to significant welfare gains for Denmark and welfare losses for the system as a whole. We show that the potential for welfare gains greatly depends on the ability of the TSO to adapt interconnector capacities to short-term market conditions. Finally, we explore the extent to which the recently introduced European "70%-rule" can mitigate the incentives for capacity reductions and their welfare effects.
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