克隆的明显独立性
Obvious Independence of Clones
AI总结：
本研究针对投票规则的策略性提名鲁棒性问题，结合策略防护场景下个体仍存在误报的实证发现，提出明显克隆独立性（OIoC）的正式直观定义，并检验五种现有克隆独立性规则是否满足该性质。
摘要：
克隆独立性（Independence of Clones，IoC）准则用于衡量投票规则对策略性提名的鲁棒性。现有文献已通过实证发现，即便在策略防护（strategy-proof，SP）场景下，由于个体未能识别SP特性，他们仍可能提交成本高昂、具有扭曲性的误报。这些问题的交叉点推动了对具有明显克隆独立性（Obviously Independent of Clones，OIoC）的机制的探索：即克隆的策略性提名/退出显然不会对结果产生影响。我们构建了投票规则满足OIoC的正式且直观的定义，并检验了五种IoC规则，以确定它们是否满足OIoC。
英文摘要：
The Independence of Clones (IoC) criterion measures a voting rule's robustness to strategic nomination. Prior literature has established empirically that individuals may still submit costly, distortionary misreports even in strategy-proof (SP) settings, due to failure to recognize the SP property. The intersection of these issues motivates the search for mechanisms that are Obviously Independent of Clones (OIoC): where strategic nomination/exiting of clones obviously has no effect on the outcome. We construct a formal and intuitive definition of a voting rule being OIoC and examine five IoC rules to identify whether they satisfy OIoC.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
