在线平台何时会支付数据红利
When would online platforms pay data dividends
AI总结:
本文通过Stackelberg博弈的委托-代理模型,分析在线平台支付数据红利的激励条件、用户隐私偏好影响及平台数据保护投资决策,为政策制定提供参考。
摘要:
包括社交媒体和搜索平台在内的在线平台,通常利用用户数据进行定向广告、改进服务以及向第三方买家出售数据。然而,用户数据隐私重要性的日益提高,催生了规范平台数据共享的新法律。此外,关于引入数据红利(即向用户支付其数据费用)的政治讨论也日益增多。随之而来三个有趣的问题:这些在线平台何时会有动力支付数据红利?它们的决策如何取决于用户对隐私的重视程度是否超过平台免费服务?平台是否应投资于保护用户数据?本文通过效用函数考虑了影响用户和平台决策的各种因素。我们构建了一个使用Stackelberg博弈的委托-代理模型来计算它们的最优决策,并定性讨论其影响。我们的结果可为试图理解强制数据红利后果的政策制定者提供参考。
英文摘要:
Online platforms, including social media and search platforms, have routinely used their users' data for targeted ads, to improve their services, and to sell to third-party buyers. But an increasing awareness of the importance of users' data privacy has led to new laws that regulate data-sharing by platforms. Further, there have been political discussions on introducing data dividends, that is paying users for their data. Three interesting questions are then: When would these online platforms be incentivized to pay data dividends? How does their decision depend on whether users value their privacy more than the platform's free services? And should platforms invest in protecting users' data? This paper considers various factors affecting the users' and platform's decisions through utility functions. We construct a principal-agent model using a Stackelberg game to calculate their optimal decisions and qualitatively discuss the implications. Our results could inform a policymaker trying to understand the consequences of mandating data dividends.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。