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arXiv 2209.11571math.OC
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一种带下降保证的雅可比型牛顿法用于纳什均衡问题

A Jacobi-type Newton method for Nash equilibrium problems with descent guarantees

Oliver Kolossoski, Luís Felipe Bueno, Gabriel Haeser

AI总结:

本文提出一种带回溯下降保证的雅可比型牛顿法,通过预测对手行动重新解释牛顿迭代,使搜索方向成为参数化函数的下降方向,从而提升非凸纳什均衡问题求解的全局收敛性和稳健性。

摘要:

求解具有连续变量的无约束双人纳什均衡问题的一种常用策略是,将牛顿法应用于由相应的一阶必要最优性条件所得到的非线性方程组。然而,当考虑博弈动态时,如果每个玩家都按照牛顿迭代来采取当前决策,那么每个玩家的目标是什么并不清楚。本文从博弈动态的角度为牛顿迭代提供如下解释:不同于最小化以另一玩家当前决策为参数的目标函数的二次近似(典型的雅可比型策略),我们证明牛顿迭代遵循这一方法,但目标函数是以对另一玩家行动的预测为参数,同时考虑另一玩家也遵循相同的牛顿策略。这一解释使我们能够提出一种新的牛顿型算法,其中引入回溯过程以保证为每个玩家计算出的牛顿方向是其相应参数化函数的下降方向。因此,除了有利于全局收敛外,我们的算法还有利于真正的极小点而不是极大点或鞍点,这与标准牛顿法不同,后者在非凸情形下不考虑问题的极小化结构。因此,与其他雅可比型策略或纯牛顿方法相比,我们的方法更加稳健,这一点得到了我们说明性数值实验的证实。我们还给出了在一些标准假设下算法良定性的证明,并结合博弈动态对其收敛性质进行了深入分析。

英文摘要:

A common strategy for solving an unconstrained two-player Nash equilibrium problem with continuous variables is applying Newton's method to the system of nonlinear equations obtained by the corresponding first-order necessary optimality conditions. However, when taking into account the game dynamics, it is not clear what is the goal of each player when considering that they are taking their current decision following Newton's iterates. In this paper we provide an interpretation for Newton's iterate in view of the game dynamics as follows: instead of minimizing the quadratic approximation of their objective function parameterized by the other player current decision (as a typical Jacobi-type strategy), we show that the Newton iterate follows this approach but with the objective function parameterized by a prediction of the other player action, considering that they are following the same Newtonian strategy. This interpretation allows us to present a new Newtonian algorithm where a backtracking procedure is introduced in order to guarantee that the computed Newtonian directions, for each player, are descent directions for their corresponding parameterized functions. Thus, besides favoring global convergence, our algorithm also favors true minimizers instead of maximizers or saddle points, differently from the standard Newton method, which does not consider the minimization structure of the problem in the non-convex case. Thus, our method is more robust in comparison with other Jacobi-type strategies or the pure Newtonian approach, which is corroborated by our illustrative numerical experiments. We also present a proof of the well-definiteness of the algorithm under some standard assumptions, together with a thorough analysis of its convergence properties taking into account the game dynamics.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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