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arXiv 2209.11183cs.GTmath.PR
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排序选择投票的噪声稳定性

Noise Stability of Ranked Choice Voting

Steven Heilman

摘要:

我们猜想,Borda计数是排名选择投票方法,最好地保留了随机损坏的选票的选举结果,在所有公平的投票方法,满足孔多塞失败者标准的影响很小。这个猜想是多元性是最稳定的猜想在排序选择投票中的应用。由于多元函数不满足孔多塞失败者准则,我们的新猜想与多元是最稳定的猜想没有直接关系。然而,我们证明了复数是最稳定的猜想意味着我们的新Borda计数是最稳定的猜想。因此,我们推断,Borda计数是最稳定的选举与三个候选人时,腐败的选票几乎不相关的原始选票。我们还采用了降维参数,以这种设置,表明最佳的排名选择投票方法是“低维”。“孔多塞失败者标准断言,如果候选人在面对面的比较中彼此都更受欢迎,那么候选人必须输掉选举。最后,我们讨论了我们的猜想与孔多塞赢家标准作为一个约束,而不是孔多塞输家标准的一个变体。在这种情况下,我们没有猜测最稳定的排名选择投票方法。

英文摘要:

We conjecture that Borda count is the ranked choice voting method that best preserves the outcome of an election with randomly corrupted votes, among all fair voting methods with small influences satisfying the Condorcet Loser Criterion. This conjecture is an adaptation of the Plurality is Stablest Conjecture to the setting of ranked choice voting. Since the plurality function does not satisfy the Condorcet Loser Criterion, our new conjecture is not directly related to the Plurality is Stablest Conjecture. Nevertheless, we show that the Plurality is Stablest Conjecture implies our new Borda count is Stablest conjecture. We therefore deduce that Borda count is stablest for elections with three candidates when the corrupted votes are nearly uncorrelated with the original votes. We also adapt a dimension reduction argument to this setting, showing that the optimal ranked choice voting method is "low-dimensional." The Condorcet Loser Criterion asserts that a candidate must lose an election if each other candidate is preferred in head-to-head comparisons. Lastly, we discuss a variant of our conjecture with the Condorcet Winner Criterion as a constraint instead of the Condorcet Loser Criterion. In this case, we have no guess for the most stable ranked choice voting method.

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