arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1009.0300cs.GTcs.CC
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基于Hamming型距离的Condorcet相容规则的具体化

Rationalizations of Condorcet-Consistent Rules via Distances of Hamming Type

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko

摘要:

{ \em距离合理化}方法的主要思想是将选民的偏好视为某种共识的不完美近似,这一思想深深植根于社会选择文献中。它允许人们通过选举的共识类和距离来定义(“合理化”)投票规则:如果候选人在最接近的(相对于给定距离)共识选举中排名第一,则称其为选举获胜者。众所周知,许多经典的投票规则都可以进行距离合理化。在本文中,我们提供了一些孔多塞一致的投票规则的距离合理化的新结果。特别是,我们距离合理化的杨的规则和极大极小规则使用的距离类似的汉明距离。我们表明,杨的规则可以合理化的孔多塞共识类和汉明距离的说法是不正确的,事实上,这些共识类和距离产生一个新的规则,还没有被研究过。我们证明,类似于杨的规则,这个新的规则有一个计算困难的赢家确定问题。

英文摘要:

The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be distance rationalized. In this paper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance rationalize Young's rule and Maximin rule using distances similar to the Hamming distance. We show that the claim that Young's rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance is incorrect; in fact, these consensus class and distance yield a new rule which has not been studied before. We prove that, similarly to Young's rule, this new rule has a computationally hard winner determination problem.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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